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The Dialogic Prom ise 
ASSESSING THE NORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF 
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 
Christine Bateup† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In  recent years, “dialogue” has becom e an increasingly 
ubiquitous m etaphor w ithin constitutional theory.  It is m ost 
com m only used to describe the nature of interactions betw een 
courts and the political branches of governm ent in the area of 
constitutional decision-m aking, particularly in relation to the 
interpretation of constitutional rights.  Dialogue theories 
em phasize that the judiciary does not (as an em pirical m atter) 
nor should not (as a norm ative m atter) have a m onopoly on 
constitutional interpretation.  Rather, w hen exercising the 
pow er of judicial review , judges engage in an interactive, 
interconnected and dialectical conversation about 
constitutional m eaning.  In  short, constitutional judgm ents are, 
or ideally should be, produced through a process of shared 
elaboration betw een the judiciary and other constitutional 
actors. 
Theories of constitutional dialogue have proliferated in 
recent tim es because of the potential that m any see in them  to 
resolve the dem ocratic legitim acy concerns associated w ith 
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judicial review .  Within constitutional theory, contem porary 
scholars have tended to fixate upon finding an objective theory 
of interpretation that provides an appropriate m ethodology for 
judges to follow  w hen interpreting constitutional provisions in 
order to enhance their legitim acy.  Theories of constitutional 
dialogue offer an alternative w ay of filling the legitim acy 
lacuna, because if the political branches of governm ent and the 
people are able to respond to judicial decisions in a dialogic 
fashion, the force of the counterm ajoritarian difficulty is 
overcom e, or at the very least, greatly attenuated.1  Of 
particular interest, m any theories claim  that dialogue betw een 
the judiciary and other constitutional actors is a structural 
feature of the United States constitutional system .  This w ould 
appear to alleviate m uch of the anxiety about judicial review  
that is expressed by popular constitutionalists, w ho call for a 
reassertion of the Am erican historical tradition of the 
involvem ent of the People in constitutional interpretation.2  
Dialogue theorists, in contrast, assert that this involvem ent 
already occurs.3 
If anything, theories of constitutional dialogue are even 
m ore w idespread outside the United States.  The concept of 
dialogue has been popularized to the greatest extent in 
countries, such as Canada,4 w hich have m ore recently adopted 
  
 1 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterm inacy and Institutional D esign, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 978 (2003) (advocating “dem ocratic experim entalism ” in 
institutional design, rather than turning to constitutional dialogue, as a w ay of 
resolving dem ocratic legitim acy concerns). 
 2 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 208 (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES] (“Bear in  m ind that popular constitutionalism  never denied 
courts the pow er of judicial review : it denied only that judges had final say.”); MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 174 (1999) [hereinafter 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION] (“Populist constitutional law  seeks to distribute 
constitutional responsibility throughout the population.”); Larry D. Kram er, W e the 
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13-14 (2001) (supporting a system  of popular 
constitutionalism  in w hich the executive and legislative branches of governm ent, as 
agents of the people, have an equal role to the Court in  constitutional interpretation 
and im plem entation). 
 3 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism , 
D epartm entalism , and Judicial Suprem acy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1041-42 (2004) 
[hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism ] (critiquing Kram er’s approach 
to popular constitutionalism  from  a dialogic perspective). 
 4 See generally KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001) [hereinafter ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT 
ON TRIAL]; Kent Roach, Constitutional and Com m on Law  D ialogues Betw een the 
Suprem e Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. B. REV. 481 (2001) [hereinafter 
Roach, D ialogues]; Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter D ialogue Betw een 
Courts and Legislatures (O r Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing 
After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997) [hereinafter Hogg & Bushell, D ialogue]. 
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Bills of Rights.5  Scholars frequently state that these “m odern” 
or “w eak form ” Bills of Rights contem plate dialogue, due to the 
fact that they contain deliberate m echanism s enabling 
legislative responses to judicial decisions about rights.$  In  this 
context, not only does conceiving of constitutionalism  as 
involving a dialogue betw een courts and the political branches 
of governm ent tem per concerns about the dem ocratic deficit of 
judicial review , but it also enables the innovative institutional 
features of these Bills of Rights to be better incorporated into 
norm ative constitutional theory. 
This article provides a critical account of theories of 
constitutional dialogue in order to determ ine w hich of these 
theories hold the greatest norm ative prom ise.  This requires 
answ ering tw o separate questions.  The first is w hether 
theories of constitutional dialogue are able to accom plish their 
goal of resolving the dem ocratic objection to judicial review .  
The second is w hether, legitim acy aside, the different theories 
provide an attractive norm ative vision of the role of judicial 
review  in dem ocratic constitutionalism . 
The answ ers to these questions vary depending on 
w hether the theories are principally positive or norm ative, and 
on the specific dialogic role that is ascribed to the judiciary.  As 
a general m atter, the m ore prescriptive the theory, the less 
likely it is to address legitim acy concerns adequately.  Because 
  
 5 See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum , The N ew  Com m onw ealth M odel of 
Constitutionalism , 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 710 (2001) (arguing that the constitutional 
and statutory bills of rights adopted in Canada, New  Zealand and the United Kingdom  
attem pt to create “joint responsibility . . . and deliberative dialogue betw een courts and 
legislatures”); C.A. Gearty, Reconciling Parliam entary D em ocracy and H um an R ights, 
118 LAW Q . REV. 248, 248-49 (2002) (arguing that a significant feature of the United 
Kingdom  Hum an Rights Act is the potential dialogic tension it creates betw een the 
legislature and the judiciary); Tom  R. Hickm an, Constitutional D ialogue, 
Constitutional Theories and the H um an R ights Act 1998, 2005 PUB. L. 30$, 307 (U.K.) 
(arguing that a “strong form ” version of dialogue best reflects the form  of 
constitutionalism  em bodied in  the United Kingdom  Hum an Rights Act).  In European 
countries w ith  centralized system s of judicial review , the notion of constitutional 
dialogue has also been used to explain the relationship betw een constitutional courts 
and the political branches of governm ent.  See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING 
WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 22, 92 (2000); Alec Stone Sw eet, 
Constitutional D ialogues: Protecting R ights in Xrance, G erm any, Italy &  Spain, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 8, 8 (Sally J. Kenney et al. 
eds., 1999). 
 $ See, e.g., Sandra Fredm an, Judging D em ocracy: The Role of the Judiciary 
under the H RA 1998, 53 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 99, 119 (2000) (arguing that due to the 
fact that the final w ord about the interpretation of rights under the Hum an Rights Act 
rem ains w ith  the legislature, “a dialogue of sorts is set up betw een the courts and 
Parliam ent”); Kent Roach, D ialogic Judicial R eview  and Its Critics, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 
49, 49 (2004) [hereinafter Roach, D ialogic Judicial R eview ] (claim ing that the structure 
of the Canadian Charter “contem plates and invites dialogue”). 
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prescriptive theories tend to privilege the role of judges in 
constitutional decision-m aking, w ithout sufficient reason, and 
leave lim ited space for independent political judgm ents, they 
fail to provide a satisfactory answ er to legitim acy concerns.  
Positive accounts, on the other hand, often provide m ore 
persuasive evidence that concern about the 
counterm ajoritarian difficulty is overstated.  How ever, these 
accounts them selves are subject to criticism , as they frequently 
fail to offer an attractive norm ative vision of w hat judicial 
review  should accom plish in m odern society. 
This article argues that the m ost prom ising positive 
theories are “equilibrium ” and “partnership” theories of 
constitutional dialogue.  Equilibrium  theories focus on the 
judiciary’s capacity to facilitate society-w ide constitutional 
debate, w hile partnership theories draw  attention to m ore 
distinct “judicial” and “legislative” functions that the different 
branches of governm ent respectively perform .  These theories 
have considerable norm ative potential because they provide 
attractive explanations of the judicial role in dialogue that do 
not privilege the contributions of judges.  In  order to provide 
the m ost satisfying norm ative account of the role of judicial 
review  in m odern constitutionalism , this article concludes that 
equilibrium  and partnership theories should be synthesized, 
creating dialogic fusion.  This w ill not only produce a vision of 
dialogue that effectively accounts for the different roles that 
the various participants can play in the elaboration of 
constitutional m eaning, but it w ill also enable a m ore 
com prehensive understanding of the different institutional and 
social aspects of constitutional dialogue. 
Part II of this article explains the em ergence of theories 
of constitutional dialogue in contem porary scholarship, 
connecting this to their perceived ability to resolve m any of the 
dem ocratic legitim acy concerns associated w ith judicial review .  
Part III provides a typology of the differing theories of dialogue, 
assessing each in term s of its ability to (a) address the 
dem ocratic legitim acy concerns associated w ith judicial review , 
and (b) provide a norm atively attractive account of the role of 
judicial review .7  Although theories of dialogue abound, no 
  
 7 The focus here w ill be on  theories of constitutional dialogue that have 
em erged in  the United States and Canada.  Although this necessarily excludes a sm all 
am ount of literature from  other nations, the theories that have em erged in  these tw o 
countries are by far the richest theories of dialogue that have been proposed and 
provide a fairly com plete review  of the range of features that a theory of constitutional 
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scholar to date has attem pted to categorize them  
com prehensively, explaining the im portant w ays in w hich the 
various accounts both converge and differ.  Part IV then 
explores how  a dialogic fusion betw een equilibrium  and 
partnership m odels both satisfies concerns about the 
counterm ajoritarian difficulty and offers an attractive 
norm ative vision of constitutional dialogue, as w ell as 
proposing a range of directions for future research. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIALOGUE 
Norm ative constitutional theory has long been 
dom inated by concerns that judicial review  is incom patible 
w ith dem ocracy.  In  the United States, the issue has concerned 
scholars at least since Thayer fam ously argued, in 1893, that 
judicial review  debilitates the political branches of 
governm ent.8  In  the 19$0s, Bickel labeled the inconsistency of 
judicial review  w ith dem ocracy the “counterm ajoritarian 
difficulty.”9  Since Bickel, the question of the dem ocratic 
legitim acy of judicial review  has overshadow ed all other 
theoretical inquiries w ithin norm ative constitutional 
scholarship.10  While this “obsession” is m ost apparent w ithin 
Am erican constitutional theory, due both to the lengthy history 
of judicial review  in the United States and the passionate 
political and legal controversies that the exercise of this pow er 
by the judiciary has engendered, concern about reconciling 
  
dialogue m ay have.  A different objection that m ight be raised concerning this 
m ethodology relates to the different constitutional provisions and structures of the 
United States Constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom s, w hich 
m any com m entators have argued affect the nature of the dialogic interactions that 
occur in  those system s.  Even accepting this is true, there nonetheless rem ains value in 
taking a step back from  these distinct structural provisions in order to com pare the 
norm ative and prescriptive insights that different theories of constitutional dialogue 
provide. 
 8 Jam es B. Thayer, The O rigin and Scope of the Am erican D octrine of 
Constitutional Law , 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 15$ (1893). 
 9 ALEX ANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1$ (19$2) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH]; see also Barry Friedm an, The H istory of the Counterm ajoritarian D ifficulty, 
Part O ne: The Road to Judicial Suprem acy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998) (“The 
‘counterm ajoritarian difficulty’ has been the central obsession of m odern constitutional 
scholarship.”). 
 10 In  relation to the history of concerns about the counterm ajoritarian 
difficulty in  the United States, see generally Barry Friedm an, The Birth of an 
Academ ic O bsession: The H istory of the Counterm ajoritarian D ifficulty, Part Xive, 112 
YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
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judicial authority w ith dem ocratic theory also anim ates 
constitutional discussion in a range of other nations.11 
Conventional attem pts to resolve the 
counterm ajoritarian difficulty, both in the United States and in 
other nations, have centered on proposing objective theories of 
constitutional interpretation in order to appropriately confine 
judicial discretion.  This Part exam ines w hy these attem pts 
have failed to alleviate counterm ajoritarian concerns.  It then 
introduces dialogue theory’s novel solution to this vexing issue.  
A. The D em ocratic D eficit of Judicial Review  and the 
Xailure of Contem porary Constitutional Theory 
When exam ining w hy judicial review  is com m only 
regarded as incom patible w ith dem ocracy, it is helpful to 
return to Bickel’s description of the problem  in The Least 
D angerous Branch.  Bickel w as concerned that w hen judges 
strike dow n legislation, they “thw art the w ill” of the prevailing 
political m ajority.12  Although Bickel recognized that the 
political institutions of governm ent often are not perfectly 
m ajoritarian and that judicial review  m ay have w ays of being 
responsive to m ajority concerns, he nonetheless argued that 
there rem ains “a serious conflict w ith dem ocratic theory” due to 
the fact that judges are unelected and their constitutional 
decisions are not reversible by any legislative m ajority.13  
Judicial review  is a “deviant institution in the Am erican 
dem ocracy” precisely because judges, w ho are not electorally 
accountable for their actions, are able to strike dow n legislation 
that has been enacted by those w ho represent the w ill of the 
people.14 
Concerns about the legitim acy of judges invalidating 
legislation becom e even starker in relation to judicial decisions 
about the interpretation of constitutional rights.  This is 
because the indeterm inate nature of rights leads to pervasive 
yet reasonable disagreem ent about how  rights should be 
conceived, how  they should be applied in specific contexts, and 
  
 11 For scholarly w ork that raises concerns about the counterm ajoritarian 
difficulty in  the Canadian context, see ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, WAITING FOR CORAF 57-
87 (1995); F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT 
PARTY 1$$ (2000).  
 12 See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 1$-17.   
 13 Id. at 17-20. 
 14 Id. at 18. 
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w hat other values, if any, ought to trum p them .15  In  the 
context of such fundam ental disagreem ent, it is questionable 
w hether it is possible to reach “correct” answ ers about these 
issues.1$  As a result, m any now  question w hy judges should be 
allow ed to m ake final and binding decisions about the force or 
m eaning of rights, or w hether such questions should instead be 
left to m ore dem ocratic and inclusive processes for deliberation 
and resolution.  In  the face of the indeterm inacy of 
constitutional rights, it also rem ains unclear w hat techniques 
or m ethodology judges should use to interpret them . 
In  addition to their concern about judges thw arting the 
w ill of prevailing political m ajorities, Thayer and Bickel w ere 
uneasy about other dem ocratic costs associated w ith the 
practice of judicial review .  Thayer feared that judicial review  
encourages legislators to defer to judicial statem ents about 
rights rather than to engage in independent consideration of 
the m eaning of constitutional values.17  Echoing Thayer, Bickel 
com m ented that “[b]esides being a counter-m ajoritarian check 
on the legislature and the executive, judicial review  m ay, in a 
larger sense, have a tendency over tim e seriously to w eaken 
the dem ocratic process.”18  More recently, Mark Tushnet has 
defined these problem s as “policy distortion” and “dem ocratic 
debilitation.”19  Judicial review  can lead to policy distortion 
w hen legislatures choose policies based on w hat judges have 
said about constitutional norm s, rather than m aking 
independent judgm ents about w hat the Constitution requires 
  
 15 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 11-12, 2$8 (1999); Richard 
Pildes, W hy R ights are N ot Trum ps:  Social M eanings, Expressive H arm s, and 
Constitutionalism , 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); see also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 1 (199$) (stating that reasonable 
disagreem ent is an unavoidable feature of both  politics and law ); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35 (199$) (discussing the challenges that 
face the judiciary in  the face of reasonable disagreem ent). 
 1$ Recognition of this point need not equate w ith m oral relativism , just an 
acknow ledgem ent that even if right answ ers exist, the phenom enon of reasonable 
disagreem ent m eans that w e m ay not be able to readily identify these answ ers.  In 
relation to this issue, see WALDRON, supra note 15, passim ; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Im plem enting the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 58 n .12 (1997). 
 17 Thayer, supra note 8, at 155-5$ (stating that judicial review  “has had a 
tendency to drive out questions of justice and right, and to fill the m ind of legislators 
w ith  thoughts of m ere legality . . . [a]nd m oreover, even in  the m atter of legality, they 
have felt little responsibility; if w e are w rong, they say, the courts w ill correct it”). 
 18 BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 21. 
 19 Mark Tushnet, Policy D istortion and D em ocratic D ebilitation: Com parative 
Illum ination of the Counterm ajoritarian D ifficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 247, 259, 275 
[hereinafter Tushnet, Policy D istortion]; see also TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 2, at 57-$3. 
111$ BROOKLYN  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol. 71:3 
 
in  particular cases.  Dem ocratic debilitation, in contrast, occurs 
w hen legislatures enact statutes w ithout discussing 
constitutional norm s, instead relying on the courts to consider 
constitutional problem s w ith legislation. 
Responding to these concerns, contem porary scholarship 
has endeavored to form ulate an objective theory of 
constitutional interpretation that both clearly defines a sphere 
w ithin w hich judicial resolution of constitutional issues is 
dem ocratically appropriate, and w hich provides an appropriate 
m ethodology for judges to follow  in the face of indeterm inate 
constitutional provisions.  At one end of the spectrum , 
originalists argue that judges should confine them selves to 
consideration of the original intention of the Fram ers w hen 
deciding constitutional cases, in order to give effect to the 
enduring values of the People as expressed in the Constitution 
itself.20  Others suggest that a m ore substantive approach to 
interpretation is required so that judges can address the 
fundam ental m oral values that are em bodied in the 
Constitution.21  Resting on stronger claim s about judicial 
expertise in relation to m oral principle, these “fundam ental 
rights” theories focus less on justifying judicial review  as 
dem ocratically legitim ate than on stressing that excessive 
concern w ith this question leads to a w eakening of the 
judiciary’s vital function of elaborating the principled basis of 
the Constitution.  A further influential theory is John Hart 
Ely’s “representation-reinforcing” theory of judicial review .22  
Ely asserts that judicial review  can only be justified w hen the 
judiciary acts to identify and correct m alfunctions in the 
political process.  Representation-reinforcing theory thus 
  
 20 Differing conceptions of originalism  have been proposed.  See, e.g., RAOUL 
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN $-20, 193-200 (1987); ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143-$0 (1990); 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW vii, 
23-25 (1997). 
 21 Ronald Dw orkin does not see judicial review  as presenting dem ocratic 
legitim acy problem s, because the w hole point of the Constitution is to protect 
individuals from  m ajorities.  See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
57-$0, 88, 110-11 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977).  
In  Canada, fundam ental rights theory under the Canadian Charter is supported by 
Lorraine Weinrib.  See, e.g., Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, Canada’s Constitutional 
R evolution: Xrom  Legislative to Constitutional State, 33 ISR. L. REV. 13, 15, 23-2$, 43-
48 (1999). 
 22 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).  In 
Canada, sim ilar argum ents have been m ade by Monahan, relying on  Ely.  See Patrick 
J. Monahan, Judicial Review  and D em ocracy: A Theory of Judicial R eview , 21 U.B.C. 
L. REV. 87, 90 (1987). 
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confines the judicial role to im proving or perfecting the 
dem ocratic process, rather than the vindication of substantive 
constitutional values.  
Extensive scholarly criticism  has revealed num erous 
failings w ith each of these theories, highlighting either that 
objective constraints on the judiciary do not exist, or at the very 
least, that these theories have failed to identify legal principles 
that place effective constraints on judges.  Take originalism , for 
exam ple, w hich has been w idely critiqued as unrealistic and 
unw orkable.  Even if one accepted that it is appropriate to 
revert to the intention of the Fram ers in the event of 
am biguity, w hich is highly contentious, it is im possible to 
accurately determ ine the Fram ers’ view s in relation to m ost 
constitutional provisions.23  Turning to fundam ental rights 
theory, its’ claim s that judges have special abilities in relation 
to questions of m oral principle have also been criticized as 
unrealistic, given the indeterm inate nature of rights.  In  
addition, even if it is accepted that right answ ers exist to these 
questions, no consensus is possible about how  judges can 
actually identify these answ ers.24  Representation-reinforcing 
theory is also flaw ed as it is questionable w hether judges can 
really refrain from  m aking substantive value choices, as Ely 
asserts.  More im portantly, given that the United States 
Constitution protects substantive as w ell as procedural rights, 
Ely is unsuccessful in dem onstrating that the Constitution 
privileges the values of the dem ocratic process over these 
substantive com m itm ents.25  Despite these theorists’ efforts, 
objective theories of interpretation have failed to achieve their 
goal of successfully resolving the counterm ajoritarian difficulty. 
  
 23 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The M isconceived Q uest for the O riginal 
U nderstanding, $0 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205, 229-31, 238 (1980) (arguing that originalism  
fails to provide a sensible or realistic strategy for constitutional interpretation); 
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 21, at 33-71. 
 24 See, e.g., WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 15, at 180-83; 
Paul Brest, The Xundam ental R ights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of 
N orm ative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 10$3, 1089 (1981) (“Even 
assum ing that general principles can be found in social consensus or derived by m oral 
reasoning, the application of those principles is highly indeterm inate and subject to 
m anipulation.”).  
 25 For criticism  of Ely’s theory, see, for exam ple, Dw orkin, The Xorum  of 
Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 21, at 58-$9; Laurence Tribe, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 10$3, 10$4 
(1980) (arguing that representation-reinforcing theory is “radically indeterm inate and 
fundam entally incom plete”). 
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B. The Turn to D ialogue 
Given the difficulties encountered by other approaches, 
it is not surprising that theories of constitutional dialogue have 
em erged as one of the principal contenders in the quest for a 
satisfactory theory of judicial authority in constitutional 
decision-m aking.  In  contrast to theories of interpretation, 
w hich propose interpretive criteria that judges should use in 
constitutional cases, dialogue theories focus on the institutional 
process through w hich decisions about constitutional m eaning 
are m ade, suggesting that this involves the shared elaboration 
of constitutional m eaning betw een the judiciary and other 
actors.  This approach holds the potential to resolve 
counterm ajoritarian concerns because of its recognition that 
non-judicial actors play a key role in constitutional 
interpretation.  Specifically, the concerns that judicial review  
necessarily sets judges against the electorally accountable 
branches of governm ent are greatly attenuated if the political 
branches are able to respond to judicial decisions w ith w hich 
they disagree.2$ 
In  proposing this resolution to the counterm ajoritarian 
difficulty, theories of constitutional dialogue are allied w ith 
scholarship w ithin the social sciences that suggest judicial 
review  is not, in  fact, counterm ajoritarian.  As noted above, one 
of the key prem ises of the counterm ajoritarian difficulty is that 
it is dem ocratically illegitim ate for unelected and 
unrepresentative judges to thw art the w ill of the prevailing 
political m ajority.  This prem ise rests on the assum ption that 
w hen judges strike dow n legislation, their decisions are final, 
w hich is w hat serves to trum p m ajority w ill.27  Social scientists 
studying judicial behavior have increasingly dem onstrated, 
how ever, that the assum ption of judicial finality is incorrect.  
With respect to constitutional decisions of the Suprem e Court, 
w hile a judicial decision is final in the sense that it binds the 
parties to the action,28 it is rarely the final w ord in relation to 
the broader constitutional issues being considered due to a 
  
 2$ See, e.g., Roach, D ialogues, supra note 4, at 532 (“Under a dialogic 
approach, the dilem m a of judicial activism  in  a dem ocracy dim inishes perhaps to the 
point of evaporation.”). 
 27 See Barry Friedm an, D ialogue and Judicial R eview , 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 
$28-29, $43-53 (1993) [hereinafter Friedm an, D ialogue]. 
 28 Enforcem ent is not autom atic, so in  this sense it could be said that judicial 
decrees do not necessarily constitute the final w ord in  a particular case.  See id. at $43-
45 & nn.334 & 337-42.  
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variety of institutional and political constraints on the Court.29  
For exam ple, com pliance w ith Suprem e Court decisions is not 
guaranteed, but is dependent on political support and 
voluntary obedience.30  In  addition, the political branches of 
governm ent can, and frequently do, challenge judicial decisions 
by enacting new  legislation that tests or attem pts to restrict 
court rulings.31  In  the event of vigorous disagreem ent, the 
political branches of governm ent also have the option of 
punishing, or threatening to punish, the Court.  The use of 
these techniques m ay then prom pt the Court to revise or 
overturn its prior decisions.32  Given the existence of these 
institutional constraints that serve to keep judicial decisions 
w ithin dem ocratic lim its, the overw helm ing reliance on 
objective interpretative theories in constitutional scholarship 
thus appears to be m isplaced. 
The theoretical challenge that this em pirical insight 
poses to conventional debates about the counterm ajoritarian 
difficulty has arisen even m ore starkly in countries w here 
structural constitutional provisions explicitly give the political 
branches of governm ent the ability to override judicial 
decisions.  One of the m ost notable features of the Canadian 
Charter is the “override” or “notw ithstanding” provision 
contained in section 33, w hich grants pow er to the Canadian 
legislatures at both the provincial and federal levels to deviate 
from  or displace m ost judicial interpretations of Charter 
rights.33  The negotiators of the Charter considered that this 
  
 29 See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
230-33 (2004) (listing ten  qualifications to the “last w ord doctrine”). 
 30 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 30-3$ (1991) (discussing the lim ited ability of courts to achieve 
social change w ithout popular support); Michael J. Klarm an, H ow  Brow n  Changed 
Race R elations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 81, 85 (1994) (describing how  
Brown v. Board of Education caused social change prim arily through indirect m eans); 
see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQ UALITY 310-11 (2004). 
 31 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS 
POLITICAL PROCESS 20$-09 (1988) (providing exam ples of situations w here Congress 
has passed new  law s in  light of negative judicial decisions). 
 32 Even if these techniques are not used, the Court m ight nonetheless m odify 
its behavior to avoid a potential attack. See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A 
POLITICAL COURT 145-4$ (1999) (discussing the “rule of anticipated reactions”). 
 33 Certain Charter rights cannot be overridden by legislatures, such as 
m inority language rights.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom s, §§ 23, 33(1), 
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 
(U.K.).  There are also structural constraints on  legislative use of the override.  First, 
the legislature m ust expressly declare that the legislation w ill operate notw ithstanding 
certain Charter rights.  Second, as any override expires five years after it is enacted, 
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provision w ould overcom e the dem ocratic deficit of judicial 
review , as it provides a “constitutional escape valve” that 
legislatures can use to “correct” judicial decisions w ith w hich 
they disagree.34  Further opportunity for political response is 
provided by section 1 of the Charter, a general lim itation 
provision that specifies that Charter rights are subject to “such 
reasonable lim its prescribed by law  as can be dem onstrably 
justified in a free and dem ocratic society.”35  Not only does this 
provision allow  governm ents to defend statutory provisions as 
“reasonable lim its” on Charter rights, but it also provides 
legislatures w ith the opportunity to respond to the judicial 
invalidation of statutory provisions by devising legislation that 
pursues the sam e objectives by less restrictive m eans.  There is 
som e disagreem ent about how  effective these provisions have 
been in providing for political reconsideration of judicial 
decisions, particularly given that the override has rarely been 
em ployed by Canadian legislatures.3$  Nonetheless, the 
existence of these m echanism s has also prom pted 
constitutional theorists in Canada to engage in the search for 
new  w ays to reconcile judicial authority w ith dem ocratic 
theory, w ith m any turning to dialogue theories as part of this 
quest. 
The first question that m ust be addressed in evaluating 
the norm ative prom ise of theories of constitutional dialogue is 
w hether they successfully resolve the counterm ajoritarian 
difficulty, as their various proponents assert.  The answ er to 
this question largely turns on w hether the theories are 
  
the legislature m ust explicitly reenact the m easure every five years if it w ants the 
override to continue in  force.  Id. §§ 3-5. 
 34 Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Com parative Constitutionalism , 2 
INT’L J. CONST. L. (I.CON) 1, 45 (2004).  While this legislative history suggests that the 
override w as intended to be used only subsequent to a judicial decision, it has been 
used preem ptively on  a num ber of occasions.  See Tsvi Kahana, The N otw ithstanding 
M echanism  and Public D iscussion: Lessons from  the Ignored Practice of Section 33 of 
the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 255, 25$ (2001) [hereinafter Kahana, The 
N otw ithstanding M echanism ]. 
 35 The full text of section 1 is: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedom s guarantees the rights and freedom s set out in  it subject only to such 
reasonable lim its prescribed by law  as can be dem onstrably justified in  a free and 
dem ocratic society.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom s, §1, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, Being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch . 11 (U.K.). 
 3$ Com pare CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER 4 
(2d ed., 2001) (arguing that lack of legislative use of the override has led to the 
continued grow th  of judicial pow er in Canada), w ith Kahana, The N otw ithstanding 
M echanism , supra note 34, at 255 (arguing that w hile the override could be m ore 
effectively used by legislatures, it has in fact been em ployed m ore often than is 
com m only recognized). 
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principally descriptive (positive) or prescriptive.  Although 
m ost theories of dialogue resist rigid categorization on these 
term s, due to the fact that positive theories contain prescriptive 
elem ents and vice versa, placing them  along this axis does 
reveal im portant distinctions.37  At one end of the spectrum  are 
theories of dialogue that seek to provide a positive account of 
the institutional context in w hich the different branches of 
governm ent operate, developing their norm ative insights on 
the basis of this description.  Moving along the axis, w e find 
theories that begin w ith explicit recognition of the fact that 
judicial decisions need not be final, but focus to a greater 
extent on proposing a prescriptive vision of how  constitutional 
dialogue should proceed based on this positive fact.  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum  lie theories of dialogue that 
eschew  a clear focus on positive dynam ics, instead providing 
heavily prescriptive accounts of how  a dialogic system  should 
operate under ideal circum stances. 
These distinctions have im portant consequences for 
w hether different theories are able to overcom e concerns about 
the dem ocratic legitim acy of judicial review .  If the political 
branches of governm ent and other social actors are indeed able 
to respond to judicial decisions about the m eaning of the 
Constitution, as highlighted by the m ore positive theories, then 
concerns about the dem ocratic legitim acy of judicial review  are 
greatly reduced.  How ever, to the extent that dialogic 
interactions do not operate in practice, but are rather view ed as 
a norm ative ideal, a different kind of analysis m ust be 
undertaken.  The success of these theories in resolving 
counterm ajoritarian concerns w ill vary according to w hether 
the judicial role in constitutional decision-m aking is privileged, 
w ithout sufficient reason, and w hether sufficient space is left 
for independent political judgm ent. 
Beyond legitim acy concerns, theories of constitutional 
dialogue m ust be able to stand on their ow n norm ative w orth.  
How ever, theories of dialogue tend to fall short on the 
norm ative level in tw o distinct w ays.  The m ost heavily 
prescriptive theories tend to fail because they are not 
sufficiently grounded in how  judicial review  operates in the 
real w orld.  In  other w ords, even if they provide an attractive 
prescriptive explanation of the role that courts should play in 
  
 37 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., H ow  to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 535, 540-41 (1999) (suggesting that constitutional theories are resistant to 
strict classification along descriptive and norm ative lines). 
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ideal circum stances, ultim ately they cannot provide a 
com pelling norm ative account of the role of judicial review  
because their prescriptions are too disconnected from  the 
realities of judicial practice w ithin the broader constitutional 
order. 
While m ore positive theories do not have this problem , 
they can fail to provide an attractive norm ative vision of w hat 
judicial review  should accom plish in m odern society.  Positive 
theories of dialogue rest on the tw in foundations that judicial 
decisions about constitutional m eaning are not final, and that 
the political branches of governm ent and other social actors are 
also thoroughly engaged in answ ering constitutional questions.  
How ever, recognizing that non-judicial actors w ith greater 
dem ocratic credentials play a legitim ate and valuable role in 
the interpretation of the Constitution requires these theories to 
justify w hy judges should also be involved in this task.38  The 
reason w hy m any positive theories fail in this regard is because 
they are unable to satisfactorily explain som e special judicial 
role or som e unique contribution that judges m ake to 
constitutional dialogue that can account for the norm ative 
value of judicial review .  The m ost prom ising theories of 
constitutional dialogue, in contrast, are those w hich account for 
a unique judicial function that assists in reaching better 
answ ers about constitutional questions, but w hich does not 
privilege the judicial contribution over that of other actors. 
III. CRITIQ UING THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 
This Part provides a typology of the differing theories of 
constitutional dialogue, in order to provide a m ore detailed 
assessm ent of how  w ell these theories respond to 
counterm ajoritarian concerns, and how  successful they are in 
providing a norm atively attractive account of w hat judicial 
review  should accom plish in m odern society.  The Part begins 
w ith an exam ination of the m ost prescriptive theories, m oving 
progressively along the prescriptive—descriptive axis tow ards 
the m ore positive theories of dialogue.  At the end of this 
  
 38 See, e.g., Andrew  Petter, Tw enty Years of Charter Justification: Xrom  
Liberal Legalism  to D ubious D ialogue, 52 U.N.B. L.J. 187, 195 (2003) (“[I]n  arguing 
that court decisions under the Charter are ultim ately less influential than is som etim es 
supposed, dialogue theory calls into question w hy courts should be allow ed to m ake 
such decisions in  the first place.”).  Cf. Earl M. Maltz, The Suprem e Court and the 
Q uality of Political D ialogue, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 388 (1988) (“The inability of 
judges to contribute uniquely to public debate underm ines dialogue theory.”). 
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assessm ent, w e w ill have a clearer idea of w hich theories are 
the m ost norm atively successful, and a better understanding of 
w ays in w hich the dialogue project should be advanced in the 
future. 
A. Theories of Judicial M ethod 
The m ost prescriptive theories of constitutional dialogue 
can conveniently be described as theories of judicial m ethod.  
Their unifying feature is that they advocate the self-conscious 
use of certain judicial decision-m aking techniques to enable 
judges to stim ulate and encourage broader debate about 
constitutional m eaning both w ith and w ithin the political 
branches of governm ent.  Closer exam ination reveals, how ever, 
that these theories largely fail as visions of constitutional 
dialogue because their prescriptions for judicial action do not 
take sufficient account of the pre-existing positive dynam ics of 
the constitutional system . 
1. Judicial Advice-Giving 
Judicial advice-giving theories suggest that judges use a 
range of proactive interpretive and decision-m aking techniques 
in order to recom m end particular courses of action to the 
political branches and to advise them  of w ays to avoid 
constitutional problem s.  In  general term s, all form s of advice-
giving involve judges counseling the political branches of 
governm ent through the use of broad non-binding dicta.  The 
principal aim  of these techniques is to ensure that the political 
branches learn the judiciary’s view s about constitutional 
m eaning, w hich w ill assist them  in drafting new  legislation, or 
am ending current legislation, so that it w ill survive future 
constitutional challenges.39  Although judicial advice-giving 
theories purport to be dialogic in nature, w e w ill see that they 
have a range of flaw s that ultim ately detract from  the 
norm ative m erit of this claim . 
  
 39 The m ost prom inent w orks advocating judicial advice-giving techniques 
are: Neal Kum ar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998); Ronald 
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Xlares: O n Judges, Legislatures, and D ialogue, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1998); and Erik Luna, Constitutional Road M aps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1125 (2000).  
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There are tw o principal w ays in w hich judges can utilize 
advice-giving techniques in the context of specific cases.40  First, 
judges m ay invalidate legislation on constitutional grounds, yet 
also provide advice to the political branches regarding 
constitutionally acceptable m ethods for achieving the sam e 
end.41  Com m entators have referred to such m ethods as 
“constitutional road m aps,” enabling judges to strike dow n 
statutory provisions, but then offer a “road m ap” for legislators 
to follow  w hen they draft new  legislation.42  Second, judges m ay 
uphold legislation as constitutional, w hile at the sam e tim e 
using techniques that encourage political actors to revise 
statutes in order to rem ove am biguities and vagueness from  
the law .43  Sim ilar techniques are involved w hen judges uphold 
a statute as constitutional, but advise the political branches 
that any statute going further than the one upheld is likely to 
be invalidated as unconstitutional in future litigation.44  
Draw ing on the approach taken by Judge Calabresi in his 
concurrence in U nited States v. Then,45 these techniques enable 
judges to send clear w arnings to Congress regarding the 
potential unconstitutionality of its current and future policy 
choices, so that legislators can avoid political courses of action 
that are “fraught w ith constitutional danger.”4$ 
Theorists w ho favor the increased use of judicial advice-
giving believe that the proactive dispensation of advice creates 
the conditions for productive dialogue betw een the courts and 
the political branches about constitutional m eaning and 
  
 40 Katyal provides an extensive typology of judicial advice-giving techniques. 
See generally Katyal, supra note 39.  In  addition to the techniques discussed in  this 
Article, he refers to “education” and “m oralization.”  Id. at 1720.  He does not, how ever, 
focus in  great detail on  these techniques due to his principal concern to prom ote 
m ethods of advice-giving in w hich the judiciary m ore directly guides the other branches 
of governm ent.  Indeed, these techniques seem  to be of a different dialogic kind to other 
advice-giving techniques, as they enable the judiciary to influence popular discussion 
on  constitutional issues.  For further discussion of such form s of interaction, see infra 
Part III.B.2.i.  
 41 See Katyal, supra note 39, at 1718 (referring to this technique as 
“exem plification”). 
 42 See Luna, supra note 39, at 1127. 
 43 Katyal, supra note 39, at 171$-18 (referring to such techniques as 
“clarification,” “self-alienation,” and  “personification”). 
 44 Id. at 1719 (referring to this technique as “dem arcation”).  The concept of 
“constitutional flares” proposed by Ronald Krotoszynski involves a sim ilar judicial 
function.  See Krotoszynski, supra note 39, at 8. 
 45 5$ F.3d 4$4, 4$7 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (upholding 
federal sentencing guidelines w hich had a disproportionate im pact on  African 
Am ericans in a Fifth  Am endm ent equal protection challenge). 
 4$ Krotoszynski, supra note 39, at 54. 
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responsibility.  A central aspect of this dialogue is that the 
political branches can learn about w ays to approach 
constitutional problem s and are encouraged to craft 
appropriate responses.47  As Neil Katyal has argued, these 
dialogic techniques show  how  “the Court can be the faithful 
servant of constitutionalism  and act as a partner w ith the 
legislature at the sam e tim e.”48  Theorists w ho support judicial 
advice-giving also claim  that the dialogue that these techniques 
foster is norm atively desirable, as its enables judges to 
proactively protect rights w hile at the sam e tim e facilitate 
political, rather than judicial, answ ers to constitutional 
controversies.49  They argue that not only does this em pow er 
dem ocratic self-governm ent and popular accountability, but 
that it also alleviates concerns about the counterm ajoritarian 
difficulty.50 
The problem s w ith this account are so great, how ever, 
and the description of dialogue provided so theoretically 
im poverished, that it is questionable w hether judicial advice-
giving should be described as a theory of constitutional 
dialogue at all.  First, by suggesting that courts take a 
proactive approach to advising and guiding the political 
branches, this account assum es that judges either possess a 
special capacity, or can be better trusted, to resolve questions 
of constitutional m eaning and to evaluate the im portance of 
specific constitutional values.51  The theory thereby serves to 
privilege the judicial voice as the key generator of 
constitutional discussion and m eaning.  Further, this 
privileging of the judicial role does not successfully deal w ith 
  
 47 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 39, at 1794 (noting that “[s]uch advice . . . is an 
im portant step in  the creation of cooperative dialogue betw een the branches”). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1712 (“[O]nce the advice giving view  is adopted, a space develops for 
courts to act affirm atively w ithout com prom ising the pow er of these other political 
entities.”) (em phasis added). 
 50 See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 39, at 59 (“Properly deployed, a 
constitutional flare facilitates less confrontational judicial interactions w ith  the 
political branches and reduces the counterm ajoritarian bite of judicial review .”); Luna, 
supra note 39, at 1208 (“The overarching tenor of this strategy . . . should be one of 
com ity and cooperation w ith  the political branches, encouraging dialogue w hile 
tem pering the sting of judicial review .”).  Katyal acknow ledges that som e questions 
regarding the dem ocratic legitim acy of judicial review  rem ain w ith  his approach.  
Katyal, supra note 39, at 1822-23.  Nonetheless, he suggests that the advice-giving 
approach “can soften the blow  of judicial review .”  See id. at 1794. 
 51 Krotoszynski is m ost explicit about this.  See Krotoszynski, supra note 39, 
at 53 (“[E]nunciating and protecting constitutional values constitutes a duty peculiarly 
w ithin the judiciary’s dom ain.”). 
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dem ocratic legitim acy concerns, as proponents of advice-giving 
techniques claim  it does.  While the utilization of advice-giving 
techniques m ay m ean that few er pieces of legislation are 
actively struck dow n by judges, to claim  that dem ocratic self-
governm ent is enhanced by these techniques is rather 
disingenuous, as this position does not allow  real space for 
independent political judgm ent.  Furtherm ore, given the 
privileging of the judiciary’s voice in institutional exchanges, 
over tim e this approach is likely to lead to the gradual 
replacem ent of relevant legislative considerations w ith judicial 
perspectives.   
Second, this understanding of dialogue reveals a 
corresponding distrust of the ability of the political branches, 
specifically the legislature, to reach acceptable answ ers 
w ithout judicial intervention.  This distrust appears to be 
based less on a fear that legislatures are not sufficiently 
m otivated to defend rights, than on the assum ption that the 
political branches are not institutionally com petent to do so 
w ithout judicial assistance.52  Advice-giving theorists consider 
that legislatures are quite rem oved from  the task of m aking 
thoughtful and principled decisions about the m eaning of 
constitutional values, due to the force of self-interest that 
frequently com pels them  to prioritize questions of incum bency 
and the m axim ization of m ajoritarian preferences.  In  this 
context, these theorists assert that judicial advice provides 
legislators w ith the added incentives they need to take 
constitutional values seriously in the face of com peting 
pressures. 
This distrust of the political branches rests on 
em pirically dubious assum ptions about the com parative 
institutional com petence of courts and the political branches of 
governm ent that both deny any real value to the independent 
m oral deliberations of political actors, and restrict 
constitutional interpretation and the evolution of constitutional 
m eaning to judicial pronouncem ents.53  If one delves a little 
  
 52 At tim es, Katyal does refer to benefits in congressional participation in 
constitutional decision-m aking, and also as to constitutional rem edy.  Katyal, supra 
note 39, at 1757-58, 1811.  How ever, he ultim ately considers that the Court has the 
greater, m ore im portant role in  constitutional dialogue given the “‘perspicuity’ and 
‘system atic character’ of judges.”  Id. at 1757 (quoting Jam es Madison in  2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 139 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)). 
 53 See, e.g., Janet L. Hiebert, Parliam ent and R ights, in PROTECTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS:  INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 231, 234 (Tom  Cam pbell et. al. eds., 2003) 
(describing such assum ptions about com parative institutional com petence as “cynical 
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deeper into how  legislatures operate, it is apparent they do in 
fact have incentives to deliberate about issues of rights and are 
generally adept at doing so, even if they do not engage in 
deliberation in exactly the sam e fashion as courts.54  For 
exam ple, even if legislators are concerned to m axim ize their 
chances for reelection, their constituents m ay w ell care about 
constitutional rights and expect their representatives to take 
these rights seriously.55  Legislators m ay also view  their 
institutional role as one that necessitates a careful focus on 
rights.  This can be evidenced by records of legislative debates 
that show  representatives taking rights-based deliberation 
seriously and m odifying their view s as a result of discussion 
and criticism .5$  While it m ay w ell be true that legislatures 
balance rights and interest-based considerations in a m anner 
or ratio that is different than courts, given the different 
institutional incentives operating on the various branches of 
governm ent,57 these factors nevertheless suggest that 
legislatures have im portant contributions to m ake in relation 
to the consideration of constitutional values and do not require 
judicial advice to take these values into account. 
In  light of these considerations, judicial advice-giving 
can essentially be re-described as a theory that encourages 
activist judges to tell the political branches of governm ent how  
  
and narrow ”); see also Keith  E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation: Three O bjections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 821 (2002) 
[hereinafter Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation] (arguing that 
w hile “[w ]e m ay disagree w ith  the conclusions that various extrajudicial bodies 
reach . . . it is difficult to m aintain that such extrajudicial decisions are unconsidered 
or neglect considerations of justice and principle”). 
 54 See, e.g., KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 2, at 237-39 
(discussing various institutionally specific w ays in  w hich Congress deliberates about 
constitutional issues); Mark Tushnet, N on-Judicial Review , 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 453, 
492 (2003) (exam ining the incentives on  various non-judicial actors to take 
constitutional review  seriously, and concluding that “[n]on-judicial institutions can 
balance com peting constitutional interests, and they do so because they have incentives 
guiding them  tow ard balancing”). 
 55 See, e.g., TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at $5-$$. 
 5$ See, e.g., Jerem y Waldron, Som e M odels of D ialogue Betw een Judges and 
Legislators, 23 S. CT. L. REV. (2d) 7, 28-29 (2004) (contrasting the “debate” am ong the 
justices of the Suprem e Court in  Roe v. W ade w ith  debates in the British House of 
Com m ons on the Medical Term ination of Pregnancy Bill to dem onstrate the proficiency 
w ith  w hich legislatures can engage in  independent rights-based deliberation).  
 57 Mark Tushnet, Xorm s of Judicial R eview  as Expressions of Constitutional 
Patriotism , 22 LAW & PHIL. 353, 3$0-$1 (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, Constitutional 
Patriotism ] (discussing how  the balance of interest-based and rights-based 
considerations of legislatures m ay be different to that in  the judicial branch). 
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to interpret the Constitution.58  While judges m ay not 
im m ediately strike dow n legislation that does not satisfy their 
constitutional understandings, their advice is a form  of actively 
serving notice that they w ill do so in the future if legislation is 
not am ended in accordance w ith standards acceptable to the 
Court.  Accordingly, rather than supporting a genuine dialogic 
exchange of ideas am ong equals, or even the creation of greater 
space for the political branches to deliberate independently 
about questions of constitutional m eaning, advice-giving sim ply 
encourages the political branches to do w hat the judiciary says.  
2. Process-Centered Rules 
Rather than telling legislators how  to resolve 
constitutional issues, process-centered rules m erely seek to 
ensure that the political actors w ho enact statutes and m ake 
public policy decisions take constitutional considerations into 
account.  In  process-centered theories, judges are encouraged to 
determ ine w hether political officials have paid sufficient 
attention or adequately deliberated on policy judgm ents that 
affect substantive constitutional values.  If it is determ ined 
that they have not, then the judiciary m ay force the political 
branches of governm ent to reconsider their decisions w ith the 
appropriate level of attention to those values.59 
A w ide range of process-centered rules exist, ranging 
from  clear statem ent rules, w hich concern the degree of clarity 
w ith w hich political actors m ust speak w hen enacting law s that 
im plicate constitutional values,$0 to constitutional “w ho” rules, 
w hich direct attention to the proper governm ental actors to 
prom ulgate different areas of policy.$1  Another w ell-know n 
form  of process-centered rule is the “second look” doctrine that 
  
 58 Katyal him self describes advice-giving as a “proactive” theory of judging.  
See Katyal, supra note 39, at 1711. 
 59 The m ost com prehensive survey of process-centered doctrines in  United 
States constitutional law  has been provided by Dan Coenen. See generally Dan T. 
Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Xundam ental Values w ith Second-
Look Rules of Interbranch D ialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 18$$-$9 (2001) 
[hereinafter Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration]; Dan T. Coenen, Structural 
R eview , Pseudo-Second-Look D ecision M aking and the R isk of D iluting Constitutional 
Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1881 (2001) [hereinafter Structural R eview ]; Dan T. 
Coenen, The R ehnquist Court, Structural D ue Process, and Sem isubstantive 
Constitutional Review , 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281  (2002). 
 $0 See Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration, supra note 59, at 1$03-40. 
 $1 Id. at 1773-1805. 
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Judge Guido Calabresi has proposed.$2  This doctrine is used 
w hen the legislature has acted w ith “haste or thoughtlessness” 
or “hiding” w ith respect to fundam ental rights.$3  This could 
occur for a variety of reasons, including panic or crisis, lack of 
tim e, or because the legislature has delegated certain tasks to 
unaccountable bureaucrats.  In  such circum stances, Calabresi 
advocates “invalidat[ing] the possibly offending law  and 
forc[ing] the legislature to take a ‘second look’ w ith the eyes of 
the people on it.”$4  While judges m ust offer provisional 
definitions of rights w hen perform ing this role, the legislature 
can reject these suggestions if it decides to reenact the 
offending statutory provisions in the future in an open m anner.  
Using the second look rule, judges can thus enhance legislative 
accountability w hile leaving the dem ocratically elected 
legislature w ith the potential to have the final w ord. 
Proponents of process-centered rules assert that they 
enable judges to initiate a process of dialogue w ith and am ong 
political officials, leading to the shared elaboration of 
constitutional m eaning.$5  The dialogic role for the judiciary in 
such interactions is tw o-fold.  First, the use of these rules 
allow s judges to step back from  conclusively deciding cases in 
order to increase the space available for dem ocratic 
deliberation and choice.$$  At the sam e tim e, the theory 
continues to propose an active role for the judiciary in 
constitutional dialogue, as process-centered rules encourage 
judges to engage the political branches m ore explicitly and 
directly in constitutional debate w here political officials have 
m ade policy judgm ents that paid insufficient attention to 
substantive constitutional values.$7  The corresponding role of 
the political branches in this dialogue is to respond to judicial 
  
 $2 See generally Guido Calabresi, The Suprem e Court 1990 Term , Xorew ord: 
Antidiscrim ination and Constitutional Accountability (W hat the Bork-Brennan D ebate 
Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104 (1991).  See also generally Coenen, A Constitution 
of Collaboration, supra note 59. 
 $3 Calabresi, supra note $2, at 104 (“When there is hiding, neither the people 
nor their representatives are genuinely speaking; w hen there is haste, they m ay be 
speaking, but w ithout the attention required for the protection of rights.”). 
 $4 Id. 
 $5 See, e.g., Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration, supra note 59, at 1583 
(stating that “[t]hrough the use of . . . process-centered rules, the Court initiates a 
dialogue w ith  and am ong nonjudicial actors”); see also id. at 1587 (“All these 
rules . . . serve to engage political officials directly in  constitutional decision-m aking.”). 
 $$ Dan Coenen links the broader logic of structural rules to deliberative 
dem ocracy.  See id. at 18$$-$9.   
 $7 Id. at 1582. 
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decisions in an open, reasoned, and careful w ay and to m ake 
future policy decisions w ith appropriate levels of care and 
deliberation.  This approach is thus an im provem ent on 
dialogic theories of judicial advice-giving, as it recognizes that 
legislatures can and do engage in the consideration of principle 
w hen interpreting the Constitution, but also acknow ledges that 
som etim es they need to be m ore candid and open about their 
treatm ent of rights. 
Process-centered theory is also m ore successful as a 
dialogic theory in other w ays.  First, this account m inim izes 
dem ocratic legitim acy concerns by increasing space for the 
political branches to resolve substantive questions of 
constitutional m eaning.$8  At the sam e tim e, this understanding 
of dialogue is m ore norm atively attractive than advice-giving 
theory because it is grounded on m ore realistic prem ises about 
how  the legislative and political processes operate.  Although 
supporters of process-centered rules trust that political actors 
are capable and com petent to engage in constitutional 
interpretation, they suggest that they m ay not consistently pay 
sufficient attention to constitutional values due to the 
institutional features of, or conflicting incentives in, the 
political process, such as tim e constraints or electoral or party 
pressures.$9  In  these circum stances, judges m erely serve the 
useful function of engaging the political branches in a dialogue 
about the im portance of considering constitutional values in a 
reasoned and consistent fashion.   
Despite these advantages, this theory of dialogue does 
not com pletely overcom e concerns about the dem ocratic 
legitim acy of judicial review .  One question that rem ains 
unansw ered relates to how  process-centered rules and 
substantive rules of judicial decision-m aking interact.  
Specifically, w hen should judges use process-centered rules, 
and w hen should they use substantive rules to strike dow n 
legislation*  Given that the dialogue created by the use of 
  
 $8 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: 
Supplem ent, Sham , or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871, 1879 (2001) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law ] (observing that the “entire 
point [of process-centered rules] is to ensure full consideration of constitutional norm s 
by the political branches w ithout dictating the content of those branches’ conclusions”).   
 $9 As Janet Hiebert has said, “One need not accept the claim  that the 
judiciary is uniquely equipped to interpret rights to recognize the significance of the 
judiciary’s relative insulation from  public and political pressures.”  JANET L. HIEBERT, 
CHARTER CONFLICTS: WHAT IS PARLIAMENT’S ROLE* 53 (2002) [hereinafter HIEBERT, 
CHARTER CONFLICTS]; see also infra Part III.B.4. 
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process-centered rules only accounts for a particular part of the 
judicial process, w hen the Court uses substantive rules the 
counterm ajoritarian difficulty again rears its head.70 
A m ore fundam ental criticism  is that use of process-
centered rules m ay entail unseen dem ocratic costs.  While 
judicial decisions using these rules leave theoretical space for 
independent political judgm ent and action, in practice the 
political branches m ay w ell encounter substantial difficulty 
revisiting their earlier decisions.71  This m eans that in m any 
circum stances, legislators w ill unlikely be able to take a 
“second look” at policy decisions, even if the judiciary leaves 
them  w ith the opportunity to do so.  For exam ple, the political 
equilibrium  that existed at the tim e of a statute’s enactm ent 
m ay have changed, m aking it m ore difficult for the legislature 
to achieve consensus on the issue in question.  Furtherm ore, 
the issue m ay no longer have sufficient political salience, nor 
be considered sufficiently im portant, to w arrant taking up 
further tim e and legislative resources.  As a result, the theory 
of constitutional dialogue based on process-centered rules m ay 
not leave as m uch space for independent political judgm ent as 
first appears. 
3. Judicial Minim alism  
In  contrast to the theories exam ined above that center 
on how  judges can actively encourage dialogue w ith the 
political branches, judicial m inim alism  involves judges 
stepping back from  deciding cases in order to allow  increased 
space for dem ocratic consideration and choice.  This approach 
to judicial decision-m aking can be traced to the w ork of 
Alexander Bickel.  Bickel w as a strong supporter of the 
“passive virtues,” w hich include such techniques as ripeness, 
standing, m ootness, the void for vagueness doctrine, the 
political questions doctrine, and the grant of certiorari.72  In  
contrast to the Suprem e Court’s ability to strike dow n or 
  
 70 Coenen him self acknow ledges that this is a problem . See Coenen, 
Structural R eview , supra note 59, at 1890-91. 
 71 On som e of the possible difficulties w ith  legislative action follow ing judicial 
invalidation on  process-centered grounds, see Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional 
Constitutional Law , supra note $8, at 1872-7$; Mark Tushnet, Alternative Xorm s of 
Judicial Review , 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2794-95 (2003). 
 72 On the passive virtues, see generally BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH, supra note 9, at ch. 4 and Alexander M. Bickel, Xorew ord: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (19$1). 
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uphold legislation, the passive virtues are judicial techniques of 
“not doing” that allow  the Court to “persuad[e] before it 
attem pts to coerce.”73  While Bickel considered that the Court 
has a special role to play in judicial review  due to its ability to 
protect and defend principle,74 the passive virtues enable judges 
to reduce their involvem ent in controversial or sensitive 
constitutional issues in order to protect them selves from  
potential political backlash.  At the sam e tim e, judicial use of 
the passive virtues encourages constitutional dialogue as they 
give the political branches of governm ent, together w ith 
society, the opportunity to debate and resolve divisive 
constitutional issues through dem ocratic channels, w hile the 
issue of principle “rem ains in abeyance and ripens.”75 
Cass Sunstein, the principal contem porary proponent of 
“judicial m inim alism ,” advocates that in deciding cases, judges 
should adopt the strategy of “saying no m ore than necessary to 
justify an outcom e, and leaving as m uch as possible 
undecided.”7$  Sunstein goes m uch further than Bickel in 
exam ining w ays in w hich judges can exercise self-restraint 
w hen they decide cases that bear on controversial 
constitutional issues.77  In  particular, he focuses on strategies 
that lead judges to issue narrow  and shallow  holdings, as 
opposed to w ide and deep holdings, w hen they do decide a case.  
The principle of narrow ness counsels that judges should try to 
hand dow n decisions that are no broader than necessary to 
resolve the case at hand.78  Shallow ness, in contrast, requires 
judges to avoid consideration of questions of basic principle as 
m uch as possible and instead aim  to reach “concrete judgm ents 
on particular cases, unaccom panied by abstract accounts about 
  
 73 BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 28, 88.  
 74 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 75 See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 244-72 
(describing the Southern opposition to Brown v. Board of Education and the judicial 
strategies used to reduce political backlash).  In  this dialogic vein, Bickel described the 
passive virtues as w ays of “eliciting answ ers, since so often  they engage the Court in  a 
Socratic colloquy w ith  the other institutions of governm ent and w ith  society as a 
w hole.”  Id. at 70-71. 
 7$ CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 3 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]; see also 
generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Suprem e Court 1995 Term  – Xorew ord: Leaving Things 
U ndecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (199$).   
 77 This is explained by the fact that Sunstein, unlike Bickel, favors 
techniques of judicial m inim alism  for their prom otion of deliberative dem ocracy. See 
infra note 84. 
 78 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7$, at 10-11 (describing 
m inim alist judges as “decid[ing] the case at hand; they do not decide other cases too”). 
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w hat accounts for those judgm ents.”79  Although Sunstein does 
not him self describe judicial m inim alism  as a theory of 
constitutional dialogue, the dialogic nature of the theory has 
been observed and supported by a num ber of scholars.80  On 
their understanding, techniques of judicial m inim alism  are a 
form  of passive judicial participation in constitutional dialogue 
because they enable judges to open a dialogue w ith the political 
branches of governm ent, w hich serves to encourage the 
political resolution of constitutional issues that are the subject 
of disagreem ent. 
As other com m entators have observed, judicial 
m inim alism  is quite successful in responding to the 
counterm ajoritarian difficulty.  By encouraging debate and 
deliberation in the political branches, the use of judicial 
m inim alist techniques enhances the space available to the 
political branches to flesh out dem ocratic resolutions to 
constitutional issues, specifically issues of rights, w hich are the 
subject of disagreem ent.81  At the sam e tim e, the theory also 
responds to concerns about policy distortion and dem ocratic 
debilitation.  Policy distortion is reduced by encouraging the 
resolution of constitutional issues through dem ocratic 
channels, as legislatures m ust m ake independent decisions 
about w hat the Constitution requires in specific cases.  The 
problem  of dem ocratic debilitation is also reduced as the use of 
m inim alist techniques sends a m essage to legislatures that 
they cannot defer to judges to resolve difficult and contentious 
constitutional questions. 
While these are positive contributions, it is arguable 
that judicial m inim alism  goes too far in dow nplaying the 
legitim acy and com petency of the judiciary to participate in 
decisions about constitutional m eaning.  In  this regard, despite 
the virtues of dialogue in enhancing dem ocratic debate, 
Sunstein considers that judicial m inim alism  should be lim ited 
to cases that “involve issues of high factual or ethical 
  
 79 Id. at 13. 
 80 See, e.g., Michael Heise, Prelim inary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive 
D ialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73, 73, 77-79 (2000) (describing Sunstein ’s decisional 
m inim alism  as a form  of passive judicial participation in  constitutional dialogue); Jay 
D. Wexler, D efending the M iddle W ay: Interm ediate Scrutiny as Judicial M inim alism , 
$$ GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 309 (1998) (describing judicial m inim alism  as a w ay in  
w hich “the Court can open a dialogue w ith  other governm ental actors”). 
 81 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, H as the H our of D em ocracy Com e Round at 
Last? The N ew  Critique of Judicial R eview , 17 CONST. COMMENT. $83, $88-89 (2000) 
(discussing som e of the strengths of Sunstein ’s approach to understanding the Suprem e 
Court). 
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com plexity that are producing dem ocratic disagreem ent.”82  In 
other cases, the use of m inim alist techniques m ay increase 
judicial decision and error costs, and m ay threaten the rule of 
law  to the extent that it m akes planning m ore difficult.  
Sunstein also argues that judges have a specialized 
institutional role to play w here it appears that the political 
process has failed.  In  such circum stances, m axim alist rulings 
m ay be required in order to ensure adherence to the 
preconditions of dem ocracy, such as freedom  of speech, and to 
guard against defects in the dem ocratic processes.83 
This explanation of the utility of m axim alist judicial 
decisions does not explain w hy the judicial role should be 
lim ited in all other cases to one of m inim alism .  Sunstein 
favors judicial m inim alism  solely because it prom otes greater 
dem ocratic deliberation w ithin the political branches.84  Most 
dialogue theorists, how ever, also favor a dialogic 
understanding of judicial review  due to the potential it creates 
for reaching better answ ers to constitutional questions.  If one 
takes this view , then a m ore substantive conception of the 
judicial role m ay be favored for its potential to help us reach 
deep and broad consensus about constitutional m eaning, or for 
its potential to produce answ ers that com bine the unique 
institutional perspectives of diverse dialogic actors.85  There are 
thus other possible roles that a strong judicial voice in 
constitutional dialogue could play, w hich judicial m inim alism  
fails to consider.  These understandings of the value of 
  
 82 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7$, at 4$; see also id. at 2$3 
(observing that “[m ]inim alism  is not alw ays the best w ay to proceed”). 
 83 See id. at 54-57 (outlining a num ber of problem s identified w ith 
m inim alism  in particular cases). 
 84 Put another w ay, Sunstein favors m inim alism  for its prom otion of the 
deliberative dem ocratic ideals of governm ent.  See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, 
supra note 7$, at 24 (“There is a close connection betw een m inim alism  and 
dem ocracy. . . .  [T]he Am erican constitutional system  aspires not to sim ple 
m ajoritarianism , and not to the aggregation of private ‘preferences,’ but to a system  of 
deliberative dem ocracy.”).  In relation to Sunstein ’s conception of deliberative 
dem ocracy, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). 
 85 See, e.g., Paul Horw itz, Law’s Expression: The Prom ise and Perils of 
Judicial O pinion W riting in Canadian Constitutional Law , 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 101, 
124 (2000) (arguing that Sunstein ’s m inim alism  does not appropriately balance “the 
risks of judicial activism  against the risks of judicial quietism ,” given the im portant 
educative role that Court can play in  constitutional dialogue).  Cf. Christopher J. 
Peters, Assessing the N ew  Judicial M inim alism , 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1492-1513 
(2000) (criticizing substantive, as opposed to procedural, m inim alism  for dow nplaying 
the special institutional com petence of courts to protect individual rights against the 
m ajority); Wexler, supra note 80, at 337 (w hile favoring judicial m inim alism  in  m any 
circum stances, suggesting that the Court also “stands in  a unique position to spur and 
influence public debate”). 
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constitutional dialogue and the strength of these different 
conceptions of the judicial role w ill be considered later in this 
article.8$  For now , how ever, the point is flagged that one’s 
view s about the norm ative value of dialogue w ill influence 
conceptions about the judicial role, and judicial m inim alism  
m ay go too far in dow nplaying the judiciary’s substantive 
contribution to broader constitutional discussion. 
Thus far, theories of judicial m ethod have been critiqued 
for their inability to overcom e the counterm ajoritarian 
difficulty, and on the basis of the problem atic roles that they 
propose for the judiciary in constitutional dialogue.  An 
additional problem  w ith all of these theories as norm ative 
visions of dialogue is that they are not sufficiently connected to 
how  judicial review  operates in practice.87  Even  if they provide 
som e attractive prescriptions regarding the role that judges 
should play in judicial review  under ideal circum stances, these 
prescriptions w ill have little w orth if they are unlikely to be 
realized in light of the actual positive dynam ics of the 
constitutional system  in w hich judges operate.  In  this regard, 
theorists of judicial m ethod do not grapple sufficiently w ith the 
question of the extent to w hich the realization of constitutional 
dialogue depends not only on judicial action, but also on how  
the political branches of governm ent respond to judicial 
decisions in practice.  In  particular, if the form s that political 
branch responses take are less dependent on the specific 
decision-m aking techniques used by judges than on the broader 
institutional dynam ics of the constitutional order, then these 
theorists are w rong to assum e that their visions of dialogue can 
be achieved sim ply by the judicial use of such techniques.  The 
norm ative value of theories of dialogic judicial m ethod and 
their account of the role of judicial review  in m odern 
constitutionalism  is ultim ately dim inished as a result of this 
lack of grounding in the positive dynam ics of the constitutional 
system  from  w hich they em erge.  Fortunately, how ever, there 
rem ains a range of theories of constitutional dialogue that do 
begin from  a m ore prom ising institutional perspective.  
  
 8$ See infra Parts III.B.3-4 & IV. 
 87 See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional 
Theory: A M isunderstood and N eglected Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQ UIRY 309 
(2002) (arguing that norm ative constitutional theory should not develop w ithout a firm  
understanding of constitutional politics). 
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B. Structural Theories of D ialogue 
Structural theories of dialogue are based on the 
recognition that institutional or political m echanism s exist 
w ithin constitutional system s that enable political actors to 
respond to judicial decisions in the event of disagreem ent.  On 
this m ore positive understanding, dialogue about constitutional 
m eaning em erges w hen these m echanism s of response are 
engaged, enabling a dynam ic process of to-and-fro to take place 
betw een judges and other constitutional actors.  To the extent 
that such dialogic dynam ics are w idespread as a positive 
m atter, structural theories largely alleviate concerns that 
judicial review  operates in a counterm ajoritarian fashion.88  
How ever, as theories veer further tow ards the prescriptive, 
they have greater difficulty resolving the potential dem ocratic 
costs of judicial review . 
In  relation to w hether structural theories provide a 
m ore satisfying norm ative account of constitutional dialogue, 
the results are also m ixed.  In  order to do so, they m ust be able 
to propose som e special judicial role that judges perform  in that 
dialogue.  Som e positive theories of dialogue do not account for 
any special judicial role.  Other theorists do propose a unique 
judicial contribution to dialogue that is thought to contribute to 
better answ ers to constitutional questions.89  In  m any cases, 
how ever, that role nonetheless fails to provide a norm atively 
satisfying account of dialogic judicial review  because it 
privileges the judicial contribution, w hich m ay overw helm  the 
potential for dialogic contributions by the equally im portant 
political branches of governm ent.  The m ost prom ising theories 
of dialogue are those that successfully propose a unique judicial 
role that does not privilege the dialogic contributions of judges 
in this w ay. 
  
 88 Cf. Jeffrey Goldsw orthy, Judicial R eview , Legislative O verride, and 
D em ocracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451 (2003) (distinguishing betw een rights-based 
objections and consequentialist objections to judicial enforcem ent of constitutional 
rights). 
 89 What constitutes a “better” answ er in  different theories varies in  a w ay 
that parallels their differing conceptions of the judicial role.  Those based on  a special 
judicial role in  relation to principle conceive of better answ ers as answ ers w hich are 
m ore principled.  Theories w hich conceive of a special judicial role in  relation to 
facilitating constitutional debate consider better answ ers to be those w hich are m ore 
durable and w idely accepted w ithin society.  Finally, theories based on  distinctly 
“judicial” functions that judges perform  in  constitutional decision-m aking consider 
answ ers to be better if they are m ade as a result of the com bination of unique 
institutional perspectives of different constitutional actors.  See infra Part III. 
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1. Coordinate Construction Theories 
The m ost straightforw ard structural theories of dialogue 
are those based on coordinate construction of the Constitution.  
Coordinate construction is the oldest conception of 
constitutional interpretation as a shared enterprise betw een 
the courts and the political branches of governm ent, having 
first been espoused by Jam es Madison.90  While acknow ledging 
that issues of constitutional interpretation w ould norm ally fall 
to the judiciary in the ordinary course of governm ent, Madison 
rejected the view  that judicial decisions had any unique status, 
as the Constitution did not provide for any specific authority to 
determ ine the lim its of the division of pow ers betw een the 
different branches.  Sim ilarly, Thom as Jefferson considered 
that each branch of governm ent m ust be “co-ordinate and 
independent of each other,” and that each branch has prim ary 
responsibility for interpreting the Constitution as it concerns 
its ow n functions.91 
Many scholars have criticized Madison ’s and Jefferson’s 
vision of coordinate construction as dangerous, given that it 
fails to specify the areas of the Constitution in relation to 
w hich each branch should have final interpretive authority.  
Without doing so, each branch m ight advocate rival 
interpretations, none of w hich w ould have any greater 
authority or “finality” than another, leading to interpretive 
anarchy.92  Scholars have also suggested that com plete 
independence of the branches to engage in constitutional 
interpretation in relation to their ow n functions is inconsistent 
w ith the system  of checks and balances in the United States 
Constitution.93 
In  the United States, coordinate construction theory has 
been revived in recent years in w ays that purport to deal w ith 
  
 90 On Madison ’s position, see generally ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION 
IN CONFLICT ch . 2 (1992). 
 91 FISHER, supra note 31, at 238.  On Jefferson ’s position, see id. at 238-39; 
JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 78-8$ (1984). 
 92 See, e.g., Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1379 (1997) (describing 
“protestantism ” in  constitutional interpretation, w hich entails parity of interpretive 
authority betw een the three branches of governm ent, as leading to “interpretive 
anarchy”). 
 93 See, e.g., AGRESTO, supra note 91, at 82-83 (“[I]f each branch could 
absolutely and w ith  finality decide for itself the bounds of its ow n pow er, w here w ould 
be the checking*”). 
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these concerns.94  Neal Devins and Louis Fisher draw  on the 
earlier theories to propose a largely descriptive m odel of 
constitutional dialogue that does not involve com plete 
decentralization of interpretive authority, but instead suggests 
that the judiciary and the other branches of governm ent 
interact in a dialogic w ay to shape the m eaning of the 
Constitution.95  According to this understanding, not only does 
each branch of governm ent engage in constitutional 
construction by interpreting its ow n constitutional functions, 
but they also each have an additional role in relation to 
interpreting the Constitution m ore broadly.9$  This does not 
lead to interpretive anarchy, how ever, because it involves an 
interactive process in w hich each branch of governm ent is 
checked by the others, including the Suprem e Court.97 
While the Court places checks on the other branches 
through the exercise of judicial review , the political branches 
can also place checks on the Court w hen they disagree w ith its 
interpretation of the Constitution. This system  of m utual 
checks is im portant because all the branches of governm ent, 
including the Court, m ay reach unconstitutional results.  Given 
that decisions of the Court are open to scrutiny and challenge 
by other public officials, judicial decisions are not final; “at 
best, [they] m om entarily resolve the dispute im m ediately 
  
 94 See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, W ho Shall Interpret? The Quest for the 
U ltim ate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 411-12, 417 (198$) (supporting 
m odified “departm entalism ”); Michael S. Paulsen, The M ost D angerous Branch: 
Executive Pow er to Say W hat the Law  Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) (suggesting that 
“the pow er to interpret law  is not the sole province of the judiciary; rather, it is a 
divided, shared pow er not delegated to any one branch but ancillary to the functions of 
all of them  w ithin the spheres of their enum erated pow ers”). 
 95 See generally NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES (199$); 
FISHER, supra note 31; Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political 
Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) [hereinafter Devins & Fisher, Judicial 
Exclusivity].  More recently, see DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 239.  In  Canada, 
w hile it has not been argued that a system  of dialogue based on  coordinate construction 
exists as a m atter of description, there is som e support for the theory at the norm ative 
level.  See MANFREDI, supra note 3$, at 188 (arguing that a coordinate construction 
approach to the Canadian Charter is norm atively desirable as it w ould allow  
legislature and executives to share w ith  courts “equal responsibility and authority to 
inject m eaning into the indeterm inate w ords and phrases of the Charter”); Christopher 
P. Manfredi & Jam es B. Kelly, Six D egrees of D ialogue: A Response to H ogg and 
Bushell, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 513, 522-24 (1999). 
 9$ See Devins & Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity, supra note 95, at 10$ (describing 
the constitutional system  of coordinate construction as one in  w hich “each branch [is] 
capable of and w illing to m ake independent constitutional interpretations”). 
 97 As Fisher says, “Judicial review  fits our constitutional system  because w e 
like to fragm ent pow er.  We feel safer w ith  checks and balances . . . .  This very 
preference for fragm ented pow er denies the Suprem e Court an authoritative and final 
voice for deciding constitutional questions.”  FISHER, supra note 31, at 279. 
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before the Court.”98  Direct challenges com e in such form s as 
refusals to com ply, refusals to enforce, and threats to pack the 
Court.99  Congress and state legislatures can generate m ore 
subtle challenges by enacting statutes that defy or test the 
lim its of judicial interpretations.  Parties to litigation can also 
bring fresh proceedings at a later date in order to prom pt the 
Court to reconsider specific decisions.  In  such circum stances, 
the Court m ay revise and perhaps reverse previous decisions, 
thereby allow ing the constitutional interpretations of other 
branches to becom e authoritative. 
The effect of these dynam ics enabling the political 
branches to place checks on the Court does not m ean that 
judges are pow erless to m ove constitutional debate forw ard.  
Rather, the Court can pronounce its view s and m ake 
“exploratory m ovem ents” that m ay nudge the debate about 
constitutional m eaning ahead.  This m ay then lead to the 
adoption of new  constitutional interpretations by the other 
branches.100  In  these circum stances, the Court w ill only be 
checked if it steps too far out of line w ith the view s of the 
political branches and other social forces.  Additionally, it m ay 
not be checked at all if legislative inertia about a particular 
issue is too great, or if the political branches prefer the 
judiciary to m aintain control over a particular issue.101  The 
result of this interactive process in w hich no branch dom inates 
and in w hich constitutional m eaning steadily form s is 
constitutional dialogue, as “all three institutions are able to 
expose w eaknesses, hold excesses in check, and gradually forge 
a consensus on constitutional issues.”102  In  addition to 
describing the positive dynam ics of constitutional 
interpretation in the United States, this understanding of 
dialogue is also supported as a norm atively desirable w ay for 
constitutional m eaning to develop over tim e, both because the 
Am erican constitutional system  dem onstrates a clear 
  
 98 Devins & Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity, supra note 95, at 91. 
 99 See generally FISHER, supra note 31, at ch. $. 
 100 Id. at 27$; see also DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 234 (“Courts 
som etim es get out in  front of an  issue and, in  so doing, set in  m otion a constructive 
interbranch dynam ic that otherw ise w ouldn’t take place.”). 
 101 See, e.g., DEVINS, supra note 95, at 139-45, 150-53 (describing legislative 
inertia regarding abortion). 
 102 FISHER, supra note 31, at 275; accord DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 
239. 
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preference for fragm ented pow er,103 and because such “vigorous 
interchange” betw een equal actors results in m ore “vibrant and 
durable” interpretation of the Constitution.104 
In  both its descriptive and norm ative dim ensions, 
coordinate construction has a num ber of beneficial features.  
First, Devins and Fisher m ake a valuable contribution by 
providing concrete exam ples that dem onstrate that judges do 
not have a m onopoly on constitutional interpretation.105  These 
em pirical insights reveal that constitutional interpretation, as 
a m atter of description and as a m atter of historical practice in 
the United States, occurs in diverse form s and is undertaken 
by a range of constitutional actors.10$  Given that the bulk of 
norm ative constitutional theory begins from  the prem ise of 
judicial suprem acy and rarely questions w hether this is correct 
as a m atter of description, this is, in itself, an im portant 
contribution.  Second, and perhaps m ost im portantly, this 
account effectively stresses that the political branches of 
governm ent are com petent and m otivated to engage in 
constitutional interpretation.  This is an im provem ent on m any 
conventional theories of constitutional interpretation (and even 
m any theories of dialogue), w hich rest on the em pirically 
contentious assum ption that the political branches are not 
sufficiently m otivated to give adequate attention to issues of 
principle, nor institutionally capable of engaging in principled 
constitutional interpretation.107 
Coordinate construction also does a better job of 
rebutting concerns about the dem ocratic legitim acy of judicial 
review  than the theories of judicial m ethod surveyed in the 
previous Part.108  Particularly in its descriptive dim ensions, by 
dem onstrating that the judiciary often does not have the final 
  
 103 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 31, at 279 (“Judicial review  fits our 
constitutional system  because w e like to fragm ent pow er.  We feel safer w ith  checks 
and balances . . . .”). 
 104 DEVINS, supra note 95, at 1$2; DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 235 
(“[H]ydraulic pressures w ithin the political system  m ake the Constitution m ore 
enduring and stable.”). 
 105 See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at chs. 3-9 (describing the 
process of coordinate construction in  diverse constitutional areas, including federalism , 
the w ar pow er, privacy and race). 
 10$ See, e.g., KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 5 (1999); 
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by M em bers of Congress, $3 N.C. L. REV. 
707 (1985); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Suprem acy and N onjudicial Interpretation of the 
Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q . 359 (1997) (discussing “nonjudicial 
constitutional interpretation”).  
 107 See supra notes 53-57 and accom panying text. 
 108 See supra Part III.A. 
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w ord on constitutional questions, this account largely displaces 
counterm ajoritarian concerns.109  No m atter w hat form  of 
adjudication the Court undertakes, its decisions are subject to 
the political process and to continued checking and political 
revision. 
Despite these positive contributions, coordinate 
construction ultim ately fails to provide either a satisfactory 
descriptive or norm ative account of constitutional dialogue.  As 
a m atter of description, Devins and Fisher seem  to understate 
the dialogic role of the judiciary.  In  analyzing the dialogue 
prom pted by Roe v. W ade,110 for exam ple, Devins describes the 
“institutional tugs and pulls” that took place betw een various 
constitutional actors.111  Each branch of governm ent had 
different view s about the controversy, and “pushed and 
influenced” the others about its view s.  Nonetheless, in tim e, 
the elected branches cam e to accept and em brace judicially 
created norm s about abortion, w hich ultim ately set the 
param eters of the constitutional debate.112  According to Devins, 
the Court’s view s grew  to be so influential not because of any 
special content of judicial decisions or any special judicial role 
in the debate, but largely due to legislative acquiescence and 
because the political branches seem ed to prefer that the Court 
retain principal control over the issue.113   
It is unlikely, how ever, that this description com pletely 
reveals the nature of the Court’s involvem ent in dialogue in the 
United States.  Although Devins alludes to a possible educative 
function of the Court in his discussion of the abortion 
controversy, he does not develop this suggestion in any detail.114  
Other scholars w ho have exam ined the abortion controversy, in 
contrast, have not been so reticent about describing additional 
  
 109 See FISHER, supra note 31, at 273 (“It is this process of give and take and 
m utual respect that perm its the unelected Court to function in  a dem ocratic society.”). 
 110 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 111 DEVINS, supra note 95, at 137; see also Devins & Fisher, Judicial 
Exclusivity, supra note 95, at 85 (“The tugs and pulls of politics . . . m ake the 
Constitution m ore relevant and m ore durable.”). 
 112 DEVINS, supra note 95, at 148 (“Without question, the Court has set the 
param eters of elected-governm ent decision-m aking.”). 
 113 See, e.g., id. at 145, 152; see also DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 235 
(“Although the Court [in  Casey] signaled its increased w illingness to uphold abortion 
regulations, state law m akers (fearing a backlash from  pro-choice voters) have typically 
steered clear of the abortion issue.”). 
 114 DEVINS, supra note 95, at 149 (“The executive, legislative and judicial 
branches are engaged in  an ongoing dialogue, w ith  each branch checking (and perhaps 
educating) the others.”). 
1142 BROOKLYN  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol. 71:3 
 
judicial contributions to that dialogue.  These com m entators 
claim  that although the Court’s w ord has, over tim e, resolved 
the abortion controversy to a large extent (or at least stabilized 
it), judicial decisions have also served to facilitate broader 
constitutional debate by draw ing various interested groups in 
society into the discussion, and shaping the content of the 
debate that continues to take place.115  Furtherm ore, evidence 
suggests that the abortion debate did not only involve different 
constitutional actors struggling against each other.  Instead, 
the different branches of governm ent including the Court, 
together w ith the people, w ere educated by the dialogic input of 
each other, leading to substantive m odification of their 
positions and further constitutional change over tim e as the 
parties adapted their view s.11$  This com peting description of 
the abortion debate suggests that the Court plays a m ore 
substantive role in constitutional dialogue than coordinate 
construction theorists recognize. 
A second, and m ore dam aging, critique of coordinate 
construction relates to its com petitive vision of constitutional 
dialogue.  The theory’s focus on m utual com petition for 
constitutional m eaning, due to the central position of checks 
and balances in the theory, suggests that consensus is only 
achieved once the political process has run its course.  In  the 
result, w hichever branch is the strongest institutionally on a 
particular constitutional issue w ill prevail in the battle for 
constitutional m eaning or, at the least, the other participants 
in the dialogue w ill acquiesce to that branch ’s view s.117  The 
ultim ate goal of constitutional dialogue on this understanding 
is to reach better, m ore durable and w idely accepted answ ers 
about constitutional m eaning.  According to Devins and Fisher, 
the m ore com peting voices involved, the m ore likely it is that 
this goal w ill be achieved.118 
  
 115 See Friedm an, D ialogue and Judicial R eview , supra note 27, at $58-$8 and 
references contained therein.  In  relation to Friedm an ’s account of dialogue, see infra 
Part III.B.3. 
 11$ See, e.g., Friedm an, D ialogue and Judicial R eview , supra note 27, at $$3 
(“This process can hardly be described exclusively as the Court speaking and the 
legislatures listening.  The Court undoubtedly w as educated along the w ay, as to both  
the types of regulation that m ight occur and the intensity of popular opinion.”); see also 
infra Part III.B.3. 
 117 See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 23$ (“Attaining an 
equilibrium  . . . require[s] all branches and all levels of governm ent to do battle w ith 
one another.”). 
 118 See, e.g., DEVINS, supra note 95, at 1$2 (“[T]he m ore actors are interpreting 
the Constitution and butting heads w ith  each other, the better.”). 
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It is questionable, how ever, w hether a system  of m utual 
com petition for constitutional m eaning is really the best w ay to 
achieve enduring and w idely supported answ ers about 
constitutional m eaning.  If parties m erely fight for their view s 
to be accepted and the strongest party w ins, it seem s m ore 
likely that acquiescence rather than enduring agreem ent w ill 
be the result.  In  contrast, reaching stable and m ore w idely 
accepted answ ers seem s m ore feasible if the different parties to 
dialogue actively discuss their view s and learn from  one 
another’s perspectives. 
Conceiving of the judiciary as sim ply adding another 
com petitive voice to constitutional dialogue also seem s to be a 
thin reed on w hich to justify judicial involvem ent, as it does not 
explain any distinctive or unique judicial contribution that 
adds som ething substantive to the shared elaboration of 
constitutional m eaning.119  If judges are just another voice,120 
then arguably this role could better be perform ed by a non-
judicial and possibly m ore dem ocratic institution or range of 
institutions w ithin society.  We are therefore left w ith the need 
to find a theory that proposes som e institutionally unique role 
that judges perform  in dialogue that assists in achieving better 
results. 
2. Theories of Judicial Principle 
In  contrast to coordinate construction, w hich proposes 
no special role for the judiciary in constitutional dialogue, 
positive theories of judicial principle propose that judges 
perform  a unique dialogic function based on their special 
institutional com petence in relation to m atters of principle.  
Som e scholars claim  that dialogue is generated as a result of 
the political branches checking the principled interpretations of 
the Court in the event of judicial error.  Others dow nplay the 
role of the political checks on the Court, and instead focus on 
how  dialogue em erges through the legislative articulation of 
  
 119 Devins and Fisher have m ore recently claim ed that each party to 
constitutional dialogue has “unique strengths and w eaknesses” and m ay have unique 
perspectives on  constitutional issues, based largely on  the idea that judges and 
politicians “som etim es react[] differently to social and political forces.” DEVINS & 
FISHER, supra note 29, at 234, 238.  They do not develop these points in  detail.  If they 
did, it m ay be that their view s w ill shift further along the continuum  of dialogue 
theories and aw ay from  a coordinate construction approach. 
 120 See, e.g., MANFREDI, supra note 3$, at 199 (arguing that the Court sim ply 
“add[s] another thoughtful voice to the continuing public debate about the principles by 
w hich w e should be governed”). 
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policy objectives w hen the legislature responds to judicial 
decisions.  Nonetheless, due to the w ay in w hich these theories 
privilege the judicial role, they are also norm atively deficient 
because they ultim ately result in top-dow n descriptions of 
legislative acquiescence to judicial pronouncem ents of 
principle. 
a. Principle and Political Checks on the Court 
Alexander Bickel w as the first constitutional theorist to 
propose an account of dialogue that w as based on a strong 
judicial role in relation to principle.121  Bickel considered that 
the judiciary has a special ability to preserve, protect, and 
defend principle due to its political insulation and the 
“m arvelous m ystery of tim e” that com es from  considering the 
constitutionality of legislation in the context of concrete cases, 
w hich gives courts the capacity for “‘sober second thought.’”122  
In  order to identify and extract the deep and enduring 
constitutional principles valued by society, he counseled that 
judges should im m erse them selves in the historical traditions 
of society and in the “thought and vision of the philosophers 
and the poets.”123  Bickel recognized, how ever, that Congress 
and the political branches of governm ent m ay be better 
situated to determ ine fundam ental societal values in m any 
circum stances, given their relative proxim ity to the people.  
Accordingly, judges should seek to declare principles that w ill 
gain general and w idespread acceptance in the foreseeable 
future.  In  this educative role, “[t]he Court is a leader of 
opinion, not a m ere register of it.”124 
Although Bickel considered that judges are better 
situated to be a “voice of reason” than the political branches, he 
w as also receptive to the fact that “elem ents of explosion” and 
violent political backlash can lead to the defeat of judicial 
decisions w ith w hich society strongly disagrees.125  As discussed 
previously, this m ay lead the judiciary to em ploy the “passive 
  
 121 See generally BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9. 
 122 Id. at 25-2$, 188, 2$1 (quoting Justice Stone). 
 123 Id. at 23$. 
 124 Id. at 239. 
 125 See id. at 244-72 (describing the Southern opposition to Brown v. Board of 
Education and the judicial strategies used to reduce political backlash); see also 
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1978) [hereinafter 
BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS] (“The effectiveness of the judgm ent [of the Suprem e 
Court] universalized depends on consent and adm inistration.”). 
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virtues,” such as standing, m ootness, and the political question 
doctrine, in order to avoid principled judgm ent on contentious 
social issues.12$  In  other circum stances, the judiciary can, and 
does, use the alternative strategy of provoking and prom pting 
the other branches of governm ent to consider its view s about 
principle.  It does so by engaging them  and the people in 
“dialogues and ‘responsive readings’” about the m eaning of 
constitutional values.127  Alternatively, conversations can be 
com m enced by the political branches, though such dialogues 
m ay be “less polite” given they do not begin from  a position of 
principle.128  
Bickel’s dialogic legacy is evident in a num ber of 
contem porary theories of constitutional dialogue, popular in 
both the United States and Canada, w hich propose a sim ilar 
role for the judiciary in relation to questions of principle.129  
Michael Perry, for exam ple, portrays the form  of principle that 
judges identify in self-consciously m oral-political term s, 
describing the function of judges as “prophetic; it is to call the 
Am erican people . . . to provisional judgm ent.”130  In  perform ing 
this prophetic function, Perry argues that the judiciary is both 
  
 12$ See supra Part III.A.3. 
 127 BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 20$; see also id. 
at 240 (discussing the Court’s “continuing colloquy w ith  the political institutions and 
w ith  society at large”).  
 128 Id. at 239. 
 129 In  the United States, Michael Perry has been the principal proponent of 
this view  of dialogue.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS ch . 4 (1982) [hereinafter PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION]; MICHAEL J. 
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS (1994); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, 
The Courts and the Q uestion of M inim alism , 88 NW. U. L. REV. 84 (1993) [hereinafter 
Perry, M inim alism ]; Michael J. Perry, Protecting H um an R ights in a D em ocracy: W hat 
Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. $35 (2003) [hereinafter Perry, Protecting 
H um an R ights].  Sim ilar theories of constitutional dialogue have been proposed by 
John Agresto, Paul Dim ond and Stanley Ingber. See, e.g., AGRESTO, supra note 91; 
PAUL R. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE (1989); Stanley Ingber, 
Judging W ithout Judgm ent: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the D em ise of D ialogue, 
4$ RUTGERS L. REV. 1473 (1994).  Support for this m odel in  the Canadian context is 
found in Perry, Protecting H um an R ights, supra, and in the w ork of Paul Weiler.  See 
Paul C. Weiler, R ights and Judges in a D em ocracy: A N ew  Canadian Version, 18 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, $0-$1 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, R ights and Judges]; Paul C. 
Weiler, Of Judges and R ights, or Should Canada H ave a Constitutional Bill of R ights?, 
$0 DALHOUSIE REV. 205 (1980) [hereinafter Weiler, Of Judges and R ights]. 
 130 PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 129, at 98-99.  John Agresto speaks 
in  the grandest fashion about the Court’s role in  constitutional dialogue based on  its 
ability to consider questions of principle, w hen he describes “its potential to help us 
apply and develop our fundam ental principles and constitutional com m ands, [and] its 
ability . . . to help bring our philosophy to bear on our actions, to w ork out our present 
and our future in  term s of our inheritance from  the past.” AGRESTO, supra note 91, at 
15$-57; see also Ingber, supra note 129, at 1541-43 (describing a preem inent dialogic 
role for the judiciary in  relation to principle). 
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forw ard-looking and backw ard-looking; in other w ords, it 
“resolves m oral problem s not sim ply by looking backw ard to 
the sedim ent of old m oralities, but ahead to em ergent 
principles in term s of w hich fragm ents of a new  m oral order 
can be forged.”131  As a m atter of com parative institutional 
com petence, the judiciary is best suited to perform  this function 
because of its insulation from  the vagaries of politics, and 
because no other institution of governm ent regularly deals w ith 
m oral issues in a prophetic w ay.132 
While the judiciary is described as the institution m ost 
likely to m ake superior pronouncem ents in relation to 
principle, these theorists accept that judges can som etim es 
engage in “false prophecy.”133  In  order to solve this problem , 
they provide a description of a dialectical system  of review  that 
allow s the judiciary’s m istakes to be corrected by a system  of 
political checks.  According to Perry, the m ost significant 
source of political control in the United States is the pow er of 
Congress to lim it the Suprem e Court’s appellate jurisdiction.134  
Other potential political checks include the ability of Congress 
to rew rite voided legislation, its ability to circum scribe the 
holding of decisions in order to restrict their effects, the 
possibility of constitutional am endm ents or the appointm ent of 
new  Justices to the Court, or, in  a m ore specific context, 
Congress’s ability to propose its ow n view s about constitutional 
interpretation and enforcem ent under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Am endm ent.135  The relevant political check in 
Canada, in contrast, is the section 33 override contained in the 
Canadian Charter.13$  This m echanism , w hich is generally 
  
 131 PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 129, at 111.  
 132 See id. at 102 (“[T]he politically insulated federal judiciary is m ore 
likely . . . to m ove us in  the direction of a right answ er (assum ing there is such a thing) 
than is the political process left to its ow n devices, w hich tends to resolve such issues 
by reflexive, m echanical reference to established m oral conventions.”). 
 133 Id. at 115. 
 134 Perry rejects other sources of political control over the judiciary, such as 
the im peachm ent process, constitutional am endm ent, the appointm ents process, and 
budgetary control of the federal judiciary, as insufficient to check the Court.  See id. at 
12$-28. 
 135 See AGRESTO, supra note 91, at 12$-31; see also DIMOND, supra note 129, at 
4 (suggesting m ore general and w idespread checks on  the Court “either by acquiescing 
in  the ruling or by fram ing a different understanding, w hether by legislation, 
argum ent before the Court or in other public arenas, our conduct, the appointm ent of 
new  Justices, or constitutional am endm ent”). 
 13$ See Perry, M inim alism , supra note 129, at 155-5$; Perry, Protecting 
H um an R ights, supra note 129, at $$$-$7, $77 n .107; Weiler, R ights and Judges, supra 
note 129, at 79-84.  While Perry considers that section 33 of the Canadian Charter 
enables this form  of constitutional dialogue in  that country, he no longer claim s that 
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regarded as a m ore effective check than those available in the 
United States, enables Canadian courts to perform  their 
valuable role of speaking to issues of principle, w hile at the 
sam e tim e reserving an “escape valve” or “final say” for the 
legislature, “to be used sparingly in the exceptional case w here 
the judiciary has gone aw ry.”137 
Theorists of judicial principle argue that the 
com bination of these checks in different system s results in 
judicial rulings that are provisional, thereby initiating an 
ongoing dialogue about constitutional m eaning.138  First, the 
electorally accountable branches of governm ent m ake a policy 
choice about a given issue.  The court w ill then evaluate that 
policy choice and either accept or reject it on principled 
grounds.  Finally, if the court rejects the policy choice, the 
political branches m ay respond to that decision either “by 
tolerating it, or, if the decision is not accepted, or accepted 
fully, by m oderating or even by undoing it,” through the use of 
political checks.139  As a result of this dialectical process, and 
due to the court’s principled role w ithin this process, “w hat 
em erges is a far m ore self-critical political m orality than w ould 
otherw ise appear, and therefore likely a m ore m ature political 
m orality as w ell . . . that is m oving (inching*) tow ard . . .  right 
answ ers.”140 
Sim ilar to other structural theories, this conception of 
dialogue is successful in displacing m any dem ocratic legitim acy 
concerns, due to its recognition that judicial decisions are 
subject to dem ocratic revision and response.  Perry also claim s 
that the theory solves som e of the dem ocratic costs 
traditionally associated w ith judicial review , as the ability of 
the legislature to respond to judicial decisions significantly 
enhances the “political capacity” of the people and encourages 
  
this kind of dialogue is possible in  the United States because he does not consider that 
the checks in  place are sufficient to constrain the judiciary.  See Perry, Protecting 
H um an R ights, supra note 129, at $73-7$. 
 137 Weiler, R ights and Judges, supra note 129, at 79, 84.  This is consistent 
w ith  the view s of the negotiators of the Charter.  See supra note 34 and accom panying 
text. 
 138 See DIMOND, supra note 129, at 4 (stating that as a result of these checks, 
judicial rulings becom e “provisional rulings that initiate an ongoing dialogue w ith  the 
people”). 
 139 PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 129, at 112. 
 140 Id. at 113; see also AGRESTO, supra note 91, at 10 (“[C]onstitutional 
interpretation is not and w as never intended to be solely w ithin the province of the 
Court, for constitutional governm ent im plies . . . the interactive understanding of the 
people, their representatives and their judges.”). 
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“greater citizen participation in . . . ‘the conversation about 
constitutional m eaning.’”141  Furtherm ore, this m odel is an 
im provem ent on coordinate construction because it proposes a 
unique contribution that the judiciary m akes to constitutional 
dialogue. 
This account of dialogue nonetheless suffers from  a 
range of difficulties concerning the precise function that it 
assigns to the judiciary, and the process by w hich the political 
branches can respond to judicial rulings.  These difficulties 
arise from  the fact that the theory rests on em pirically dubious 
assum ptions about judicial and legislative com petences, rather 
than a m ore factually grounded explanation of institutional 
interactions betw een different constitutional actors.142  First, 
the claim  that judges have superior abilities in relation to 
m atters of principle is difficult to support em pirically.  As 
previously observed in relation to fundam ental rights theories 
of interpretation,143 given the existence of pervasive and 
intractable disagreem ent about the m eaning of rights, it is 
unrealistic to expect that judges can resolve such “hard 
questions” in a w ay that finally settles rights claim s.144  Judicial 
review  that is prem ised on the superior m oral reasoning of 
judges also cannot be reconciled w ith dem ocratic values m ore 
broadly, because it suggests that elitist rule is preferable to 
leaving decisions in the hands of the people’s representatives. 
Most scholars w ho favor this understanding of dialogue 
nonetheless argue that judges rem ain better suited to decide 
m atters of principle due to their com parative institutional 
com petences.  In  particular, they claim  that the political 
insulation of the judiciary protects courts from  the kind of self-
interested behavior that is thought to negatively affect the 
deliberations of political actors, w hich leaves judges w ith a 
com parative advantage as m oral deliberators.145  This claim , 
  
 141 Perry, Protecting H um an R ights, supra note 129, at $91-92 (quoting 
Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional M eta-Theory (O r, W hy, and to 
W hom , D o I W rite the Things I D o?), $3 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 407 (1992)).   
 142 Ferejohn and Kram er m ake a sim ilar criticism  of Bickel: “Bickel’s analysis 
consisted m ore of exhortation than any kind of institutional explanation of an 
observable phenom enon.”  John A. Ferejohn and Larry D. Kram er, Independent 
Judges, D ependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial R estraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
9$2, 978 n.31 (2002). 
 143 See supra Part II.A. 
 144 See WALDRON, supra note 15, at 12 (“The issues that rights 
im plicate . . . are sim ply hard questions – m atters on w hich reasonable people differ.”). 
 145 See, e.g., PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 129, at 102 (“As a m atter 
of com parative institutional com petence, the politically insulated federal judiciary is 
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how ever, rests on em pirically questionable claim s about both 
judicial and legislative behavior.14$  In  relation to the political 
branches, these theorists assert that legislatures are too self-
interested to adequately deliberate on issues of m oral principle, 
but they provide no factual support for such claim s.  As 
discussed earlier in relation to advice-giving theories, this 
claim  rests on controversial em pirical assum ptions about 
political behavior and legislative deliberation.147  Sim ilarly, 
claim s that the judiciary has institutional advantages in 
relation to the consideration of principle rest on idealized 
assum ptions about how  judges decide cases.  Even a brief 
historical overview  suggests that these assertions m erely rest 
on the “hope” that judicial review  offers, given that courts have 
not alw ays been the institution of governm ent to protect rights 
best.148  Indeed, in his later w ork, Bickel him self m oved aw ay 
from  the idea that judges have a special ability to decide cases 
on the basis of principle, due to w hat he perceived to be 
significant failures of the Court in this regard.149 
If w e consider the w ritten opinions of judges in greater 
detail, it also becom es clear that they are not alw ays, perhaps 
not even often, rem arkable exam ples of m oral deliberation.  
Rather than centering on considerations of political m orality, 
judicial decisions are m ore com m only based on purely legal 
grounds, reflecting the centrality of doctrinal argum ent to the 
judicial task.150  Furtherm ore, even w hen individual justices 
consider issues of principle in the context of a particular case, 
they m ust ultim ately overcom e disagreem ent w ith other 
  
m ore likely, w hen the hum an rights issue is a deeply controversial one, to m ove us in 
the direction of a right answ er . . . than is the political process . . . .”). 
 14$ The argum ent that decisions about rights should be given to judges as a 
result of their insulation from  self-interest also contradicts other epistem ic precepts, 
such as the principle that such decisions should be m ade by actors w ho have a 
sufficient stake in  the m atter to decide in  a responsible m anner.  See WALDRON, supra 
note 15, at 253. 
 147 See supra notes 53-57 and accom panying text. 
 148 On the tw in narratives of the “hope” and “threat” of judicial review  in 
constitutional scholarship, see Barry Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive: The 
N ature and Xunction of Judicial R eview , 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 12$7-70 (2004) 
[hereinafter Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive].  
 149 ALEX ANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3-5 (1975) (suggesting 
that judges m erely im pose personal values w hen deciding cases); see also BICKEL, THE 
IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 125, at 179. 
 150 See Jerem y Waldron, Eisgruber’s H ouse of Lords, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 89, 103 
(2002) (“The opinions of the Court are paragons perhaps of dense and com plex doctrinal 
argum ent, and often  they involve pyrotechnic displays of ill-tem per on  questions of 
interpretive strategy of the justices.  But they are risible as exam ples of m oral 
deliberation.”). 
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justices on the Court about the outcom e, typically by w ay of 
com prom ise or by vote.  Considerations of m oral principle are 
likely to be m odified or diluted as a result of this necessity for 
com prom ise.  While these features of the judicial role m ay 
support the argum ent that judges face few er incentives to act 
purely on the basis of self-interest, they do not support the 
claim  that principle w ill be m ore adequately dealt w ith in the 
judicial rather than the legislative branch, nor that m ore 
principled answ ers w ill be reached as a result of judicial 
participation in constitutional dialogue.151  
The strongest critique of this account of dialogue is that 
it contains an overw helm ing internal contradiction.152  This has 
tw o dim ensions.  First, if the judiciary is indeed the superior 
institution to deliberate on issues of principle, w hy should the 
political branches of governm ent be trusted to correct judicial 
m istakes*  If one begins w ith the assum ption that the political 
branches are prim arily m otivated by expediency rather than 
principle, as these theorists do, then it is difficult to justify w hy 
political actors should be able to overturn judicial decisions 
that are grounded in principle.  The m ost com m on reason these 
scholars propose is that political oversight is required to guard 
against the possibility of judicial m istake.  How ever, this raises 
the second dim ension of the contradiction in these theories: if 
the political branches are able to overturn decisions that are 
reached by judicial error, then an overarching theory of 
interpretation is still required to objectively determ ine those 
cases in w hich the judiciary has actually fallen into error.  As 
discussed previously, no adequate objective interpretive theory 
currently exists to assist in this task.153 
The claim  that courts have com parative institutional 
com petence in relation to principle also underm ines the 
argum ent that this account solves som e of the dem ocratic costs 
associated w ith judicial review .  Although judicial decisions can 
be challenged by the political branches of governm ent, if w e 
accept that courts have superior decision-m aking abilities in 
relation to principle, it is likely that legislatures w ill defer to 
judicial interpretations on these m atters rather than m ake 
their ow n independent judgm ents.  Legislators m ay then com e 
  
 151 See id. at 10$; DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 22$ (“A m ultim em ber 
Court, like other parts of governm ent, gropes increm entally tow ard consensus and 
decision through com prom ise, expediency, and ad hoc actions.”). 
 152 See, e.g., PERETTI, supra note 32, at $9-71. 
 153 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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to rely on judges to consider constitutional problem s w ith 
legislation at a later date, rather than consider these m atters 
for them selves at the tim e of enactm ent.  The com bination of 
these critiques m eans that w e are left w ith yet another 
norm atively deficient account of constitutional dialogue. 
b. Principle and Legislative Articulation of Policy 
Rather than focus on the role of the legislature in 
placing political checks on the Court, other theories of judicial 
principle stress that the legislative branch adds som ething 
substantive to constitutional dialogue due to its unique voice 
and com parative institutional com petence in relation to policy 
m aking.154  Legislative policy m aking is a com plex process, 
w hich requires legislators to consider how  m ultiple, com peting 
objectives can best be achieved and to m ake difficult 
predictions about the im pact of particular policies on different 
social actors.155  Given the unique legislative expertise in 
relation to such issues, dialogue about constitutional m eaning 
em erges w hen the legislature responds to the judiciary in a 
w ay that respects judicial pronouncem ents of principle, but 
w hich also allow s the legislature to articulate the im portance of 
its w ider policy objectives.15$  
  
 154 While Perry acknow ledges that the political branches have com parative 
institutional com petence in  relation to policy m aking, he does not explicitly build this 
into his theory of dialogue, instead conceiving of the legislative contribution to 
constitutional dialogue as one of placing checks on  the Court.  See supra Part III.B.2.i. 
 155 See, e.g., JANET L. HIEBERT, DEP’T OF JUST., CAN., ENRICHING 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: VIEWING PARLIAMENT’S ROLE AS BOTH PROACTIVE AND 
REACTIVE 7-8 (2000), available at http://w w w .justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/2000/rp2002-
7.pdf. [hereinafter HIEBERT, ENRICHING CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE].  This reflects the 
distinction the Legal Process School m ade betw een judicial principle and legislative 
policy m aking as a w ay of constraining judicial discretion w ithin acceptable 
boundaries.  See Dorf, supra note 1, at 920-29. 
 15$ This version of dialogue theory can be helpfully contrasted w ith  Richard 
Fallon’s theory of “im plem enting the Constitution.”  See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).  According to Fallon, the Court has a 
com parative advantage to the political institutions of governm ent in considering 
questions of principle.  Id. at 10-11, 40.  How ever, w hile the Court is an im portant 
forum  of principle, it is not only a forum  of principle, since in  the context of reasonable 
disagreem ent it m ust m ake a variety of practical calculations in  order to successfully 
im plem ent the Constitution.  Id. at 3$.  Im plem entation of the Constitution is a 
collective function that is also engaged in  by the other institutions of governm ent and, 
indeed, the prim ary responsibility of im plem enting the Constitution rests on  the 
political branches.  Id. at 37, 39.  As a result of this, despite the Court’s special role in 
relation to principle, its overall constitutional function is best described in  term s of 
im plem entation rather than interpretation due to the fact that it necessarily operates 
w ithin “a shared project of constitutional im plem entation.”  Id. at 41. 
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This theory of dialogue has becom e extrem ely popular 
w ithin Canadian constitutional theory in recent years, due to 
the com bined contributions of Peter Hogg and Alison Bushell, 
and Kent Roach.157  Indeed, Hogg and Bushell’s account is often 
regarded as the sem inal explanation of dialogue under the 
Canadian Charter.158  While the theory as currently described 
by these scholars is accordingly tied to the structural features 
of the Charter, w e w ill see that its description of dialogic 
dynam ics could also have explanatory or norm ative pow er in 
the United States. 
Sim ilar to the theories of judicial principle considered in 
the previous section, this account of dialogue begins w ith the 
assertion that the judiciary has a unique ability to provide a 
strong voice in relation to principle.  Kent Roach is m ost 
explicit about this,159 describing how  the Court “starts the 
conversation” w ith the legislature about Charter values w hen 
it decides a case, and in doing so, “draw [s] the attention of the 
legislature and society to fundam ental values.”1$0  Roach does 
not claim  that courts w ill alw ays reach the right answ ers about 
principle.  Nevertheless, he does consider that the judiciary has 
special institutional expertise to interpret rights and consider 
m atters of principle due to its relative political insulation.1$1 
  
 157 See ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4; Hogg & Bushell, 
D ialogue, supra note 4; Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, Reply to “Six D egrees of 
D ialogue,” 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 529 (1999) [hereinafter Hogg & Thornton, Reply]; 
Roach, D ialogues, supra note 4; see also Kent Roach, Am erican Constitutional Theory 
for Canadians (and the R est of the W orld), 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 503 (2002); Roach, 
D ialogic Judicial Review , supra note $. 
 158 Most academ ic com m entators w ho discuss the dialogue m etaphor in  the 
Canadian context begin w ith  Hogg & Bushell’s analysis.  See, e.g., Jean Leclair, 
Judicial R eview  in Canadian Constitutional Law: A Brief O verview , 3$ GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 543, 547-50 (2004); Leighton McDonald, Rights, ‘D ialogue’ and 
D em ocratic O bjections to Judicial R eview , 32 FED. L. REV. 1, 1-$ (2004). 
 159 Hogg and Bushell focus less attention on  describing the judicial role in 
dialogue, as their principal interest is in  exam ining “legislative sequels” follow ing 
judicial nullification of statutes, in order to support their em pirical claim s that 
dialogue is an institutional feature of constitutional review  under the Charter.  See 
Hogg & Bushell, D ialogue, supra note 4, at 79-81, 9$-98.  Nonetheless, their account of 
dialogue contains the clear assum ption that judges have a special role to play in  the 
dialogue about the m eaning of Charter values in relation to principle.  See, e.g., id. at 
79 (suggesting that legislative responses should be “properly respectful of the Charter 
values that have been identified by the Court”). 
 1$0 ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 285; Roach, 
D ialogues, supra note 4, at 484. 
 1$1 See, e.g., ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 285 (“The 
Court, is the one that m ust initiate the conversation, because the principles of fairness, 
fundam ental freedom s, and respect for the rights of m inorities are ones that are likely 
to be ignored or finessed in the legislative and adm inistrative processes.”). 
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Although the judiciary is regarded as having a strong 
role to play in judicial review  on the basis of principle, the 
legislature can m ake its ow n unique contributions to 
constitutional understanding based on its com parative 
institutional ability to assess how  policy objectives can best be 
achieved.  These theorists thus claim  that judicial decisions 
function as the beginning of a dialogue w ith the political 
branches “as to how  best to reconcile the individualistic values 
of the Charter w ith the accom plishm ent of social and econom ic 
policies for the benefit of the com m unity as a w hole.”1$2  The 
judiciary has the prim ary role in defining the principles laid 
dow n by the Charter, and is able to assist in achieving m ore 
principled answ ers by injecting considerations of principle into 
constitutional discussions.1$3  Legislatures, on the other hand, 
can rem ind courts w hy lim its on rights m ay be required in 
particular contexts, and discuss w hy they m ay have considered 
and rejected other alternatives.1$4 
Tying their account to the structural features of the 
Canadian Charter, these theorists regard section 1 of the 
Charter as the key feature that facilitates constitutional 
dialogue because it enables productive discussion to take place 
betw een the judicial and legislative branches.1$5  Under section 
1, the rights that are guaranteed by the Charter are subject to 
“such reasonable lim its prescribed by law  as can be 
dem onstrably justified in a free and dem ocratic society.”1$$  
Most cases that involve legislation being struck dow n center on 
the reasonableness of the m eans that the legislature has 
  
 1$2 Hogg & Bushell, D ialogue, supra note 4, at 105 (em phasis om itted). 
 1$3 See ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 23$-37 
(arguing that a strong dialogic judicial role “encourage[s] judges to inject 
considerations of m oral principles . . . into dem ocratic debates about the difficult issues 
that end up in Charter litigation”). 
 1$4 See, e.g., id. at 293.  Roach considers this form  of dialogue to be a 
continuation of the dialogue betw een courts and legislatures that is achieved under the 
com m on law .  Id. at 254-$3; Roach, D ialogues, supra note 4, at 503-17. 
 1$5 Unlike in  m any theories, the principal focus here is not on  the section 33 
override.  Hogg and Bushell, for exam ple, say little about this provision, m erely noting 
that it is “relatively unim portant” to the developm ent of constitutional dialogue under 
the Charter due to the fact that a political clim ate has developed against its use.  Hogg 
& Bushell, D ialogue, supra note 4, at 83-84.  Roach, in contrast, claim s that the 
override is a tool of “extraordinary dialogue” w hich results in  a “shouting m atch” 
betw een courts and legislatures and should therefore only be used in  exceptional 
circum stances.  ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 250; Roach, 
D ialogues, supra note 4, at 487, 503.  As to w hy this reflects a position of legislative 
acquiescence to judicial principle, see infra note 174 and accom panying text. 
 1$$ Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom s, § 1, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, Being Schedule B to the Canada Act of 1982, ch . 11 (U.K.). 
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chosen to pursue a legislative objective, rather than the 
legislative objective itself.1$7  Debate then centers on the m eans 
by w hich particular policies should be pursued.  This structure 
enables legislatures to lim it rights according to the standards 
that the Suprem e Court has set for section 1 justification.1$8  As 
a result, a “constructive and respectful” or ordinary dialogue 
can take place betw een courts and legislatures w hich perm its 
them  “to speak in strong but distinct and com plem entary 
voices.”1$9  While the Court engages the legislature in relation 
to questions of principle, the legislature in turn engages the 
Court in relation to how  policy objectives can best be achieved 
and w hy lim its on rights m ay be required in particular 
contexts.  If the Court nonetheless decides to invalidate 
statutory provisions, this need not frustrate legislative agendas 
because the legislature can respond by “devis[ing] a response 
that is properly respectful of the Charter values that have been 
identified by the Court, but w hich accom plishes the social or 
econom ic objectives that the judicial decision has im peded.”170 
While this account of dialogue that the Canadians 
propose rests largely on section 1 of the Charter, it is possible 
to extrapolate its understanding of dialogic dynam ics to the 
United States constitutional system .171  On the one hand, it is 
true that section 1 creates a distinct tw o-step analytic 
structure, w hich enables the Court to first identify the 
applicable right and then determ ine w hether restrictions on 
this right are justified.172  This can be contrasted w ith the 
position in the United States, w here there is no com parable 
lim itation clause in the Constitution and w here judges instead 
  
 1$7 See HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 47; Hogg & Bushell, 
D ialogue, supra note 4, at 85. 
 1$8 The standards prescribed by R . v. O akes, [198$] S.C.R. 103, 138-40, are: (1) 
the law  m ust pursue an im portant objective; (2) the law  m ust be rationally connected 
w ith  the objective; (3) the law  m ust im pair the objective no m ore than necessary to 
accom plish the objective; and (4) the law  m ust not have a disproportionately severe 
effect on  the persons to w hom  it applies. 
 1$9 ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 13. 
 170 Hogg & Bushell, D ialogue, supra note 4, at 79-80 (em phasis om itted).  In 
general term s, Hogg and Bushell suggest that dialogue occurs “[w ]here a judicial 
decision is open to legislative reversal, m odification, or avoidance” by the legislative 
process.  Id. at 79. 
 171 Cf. ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 290 (arguing 
that this type of dialogue is not possible in  the United States because the United States 
Bill of Rights establishes “absolute” rights); see also id. at 15$ (describing rights in  the 
United States as “absolute and final”); id. at 292 (“[I]t is a serious m istake to lum p the 
Canadian Charter w ith  the Am erican Bill of R ights.”).  
 172 Id. at 15$. 
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define constitutional rights in a single step.  Despite these 
differences, how ever, it is generally agreed that all rights 
contained in constitutional instrum ents are subject to lim its.  
Judicial consideration of these lim its in the United States 
sim ply takes place at the level of defining the applicable right 
w hen the Suprem e Court refers to the justifications that the 
governm ent has provided for its actions in legal argum ent.173  
As a result, although constitutional decisions in the United 
States m ay not have the sam e structure as in Canada, the 
political branches in the United States have sim ilar 
opportunities to argue before the Court regarding how  its 
policy objectives can best be achieved.  Furtherm ore, w hen 
responding to judicial decisions invalidating statutory 
provisions, Congress retains sim ilar leew ay to enact new  
legislation in an effort to achieve its objectives, w hile at the 
sam e tim e taking the Court’s pronouncem ents about 
constitutional values into account. 
While this conception of dialogue offers the legislature a 
distinctive role in responding to judicial decisions, a num ber of 
problem s rem ain due to the fact that the judiciary is still 
regarded as possessing superior abilities in relation to 
principle.174  First, this account is based on the sam e negative 
assum ptions regarding the legislative branch, and the sam e 
idealized accounts of the judicial role, as other theories of 
dialogue based on judicial principle.175  Second, although the 
theory purports to describe substantive dialogic roles for both 
the judiciary and the legislature, the nature of constitutional 
  
 173 See Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activism  or R estraint in a Section 33 W orld, 53 
U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 92 (2003) (discussing the sim ilarities betw een rights definition 
and governm ent justification in the United States and Canada) [hereinafter Tushnet, 
Judicial Activism  or R estraint].  Cf. David S. Law , G eneric Constitutional Law , 89 
MINN. L. REV. $52, $98 (2005) (observing the “sheer ubiquity” of balancing-type tests in 
constitutional jurisprudence in  a range of nations); Wexler, supra note 80, at 330 
(arguing that in  the United States context, use of interm ediate scrutiny constitutes a 
form  of balancing w hich allow s the Court to “instigate a dialogue am ong itself, its 
coordinate branches of governm ent, and society at large”). 
 174 As developed in  the Canadian context, the account can also be criticized on 
the basis that it does not explain the use of section 33 very w ell, w hich Roach him self 
explicitly acknow ledges.  See ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 
250 (“This response explains less w ell the extraordinary dialogues that occur w hen 
legislatures and courts engage in  shouting m atches and show dow ns over w hether a 
particular decision m ade by the Court w as right or acceptable.”).  It fails in  this regard 
because incorporating section 33 into an account of dialogue requires an 
acknow ledgem ent that the legislature m ay engage in its ow n principled interpretation 
of Charter values, a m ove that these theorists are reluctant to take. 
 175 See supra Part III.B.2.i. 
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dialogue rem ains very judicial-centric.17$  Even though 
legislatures are assigned a substantive role, there is 
nonetheless an extrem e reluctance to acknow ledge a legitim ate 
role for the political branches as independent interpreters of 
constitutional rights.177  While courts articulate principle, the 
legislative role in the dialogue is m erely passive or reactive, 
confined to “m outh[ing] the language of lim its.”178  In  addition, 
not only do judges get to speak in the rhetoric of rights, but as 
a practical m atter, they also have the prim ary voice in 
determ ining w hether a given lim it on rights can be justified.  
As a result, even the legislature’s contribution in this area m ay 
be a great deal w eaker than these theorists suggest.179  
Constitutional rights are thus likely to assum e “a 
superordinate im portance, resistant to balancing.”180 
The subordinate and secondary dialogic position of the 
legislature also raises great concerns about the im pact of 
judicial review  on legislative reasoning and deliberation.181  The 
risk that legislatures w ill choose to adopt policies based on 
w hat judges have said about constitutional values increases if 
legislators are not considered to have a legitim ate role in 
interpreting those values.  In  the context of constitutional 
decision-m aking in Canada, a num ber of com m entators suggest 
that this form  of dem ocratic debilitation is, in fact, occurring, 
as legislatures w ill often sim ply insert judicially-approved 
“Charter-speak”182 into legislation, rather than engage in 
deeper reflection and independent deliberation about the 
  
 17$ See, e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 4$ (“Hogg and 
Bushell portray Parliam ent’s role as clearly secondary under the constitutional division 
of labour . . . .  The judiciary speaks – Parliam ent listens.”). 
 177 See Manfredi & Kelly, supra note 95, at 523 (arguing that the m ost crucial 
flaw  in  Hogg and Bushell’s norm ative argum ent “is its assum ption of a judicial 
m onopoly on  correct interpretation,” and that “[c]ontrary to w hat Hogg and Bushell 
assert, legislatures are never subordinating them selves to the Charter per se, but to the 
Court’s interpretation of the Charter’s language”). 
 178 See Petter, supra note 38, at 19$. 
 179 Id. at 19$-97. 
 180 Jerem y Webber, Institutional D ialogue betw een Courts and Legislatures in 
the D efinition of Xundam ental R ights: Lessons from  Canada (and elsew here), in 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE $1, 97 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002). 
 181 See Manfredi & Kelly, supra note 95, at 522; Tushnet, Judicial Activism  or 
R estraint, supra note 173, at 94-100 (critiquing Roach ’s conception of dialogue under 
the Charter). 
 182 Hogg & Bushell, D ialogue, supra note 4, at 101. 
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m eaning of Charter values.183  While this vision of 
constitutional dialogue is an im provem ent on the theories of 
dialogue considered thus far, due to both its description of m ore 
substantive form s of engagem ent betw een the branches of 
governm ent and the substantive justification it provides for 
judicial participation in dialogue, it ultim ately rem ains 
norm atively deficient as a theory of dialogue due to its 
continued privileging of the judicial role. 
3. Equilibrium  Theories 
Equilibrium  theories of dialogue provide an alternative 
w ay of conceiving of the special judicial role in constitutional 
dialogue that does not privilege judicial contributions.  In  these 
theories, the judge’s role is described as one of fostering society-
w ide constitutional discussion that ultim ately leads to a settled 
equilibrium  about constitutional m eaning.  While this provides 
a m uch m ore prom ising account of constitutional dialogue than 
the theories exam ined thus far, it ultim ately fails to provide a 
com plete account of the role of judicial review  w ithin the 
constitutional system . 
The m ost prom inent descriptions of constitutional 
dialogue in this vein have been developed by Barry Friedm an 
and by Robert Post and Reva Siegel.184  Friedm an ’s is the m ost 
positive account, as it is explicitly grounded in social science 
studies regarding institutional interactions betw een the 
  
 183 See, e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 222 (noting that 
in  certain instances, legislative response to judicial decisions in Canada has been to 
“‘Charter proof’ new  legislation so as to address and anticipate the judiciary’s specific 
and likely concerns”); Janet L. Hiebert, Parliam entary Bills of R ights: An Alternative 
M odel?, $9 MOD. L. REV. 7, 27 (200$) (“[W]hat is occurring . . . is the introduction of 
judicial influence at early stages of policy developm ent, long before judicial review  
occurs, resulting in  the further isolation of parliam ent.”); MANFREDI, supra note 3$, at 
180 (“The Court’s m onopoly over constitutional interpretation m eans that public policy 
w ill alw ays be set closer to judicial preferences than to legislative preferences.”).  
 184 In  relation to Friedm an ’s account of dialogue, see generally Friedm an, 
D ialogue, supra note 27; Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148.  
In  relation to Post and Siegel’s account, see generally Robert C. Post, Xashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law , 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) 
[hereinafter Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution]; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Legislative Constitutionalism  and Section Xive Pow er: Policentric Interpretation of the 
Xam ily and M edical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, 
Legislative Constitutionalism ]; Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism , supra note 3; 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution Xrom  the People: 
Juricentric R estrictions on Section Xive Pow er, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Post & 
Siegel, Protecting the Constitution]. 
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judiciary, the political branches, and the people.185  These 
studies show  that w hile the Suprem e Court has significant 
leew ay in m aking pronouncem ents, if it strays too far from  
w hat the other branches of governm ent and the people accept, 
political constraints such as the pow er of judicial appointm ents 
and popular backlash w ill bring the Court back into line.18$  
Friedm an relies on this evidence principally to stress the role of 
public opinion as one of the principal forces controlling the 
Court.  Although this m echanism  is not understood perfectly, 
social science evidence increasingly suggests that judicial 
outcom es tend to run in line w ith public opinion over the longer 
term .187 
While these studies show  that the Court is heavily 
constrained, Friedm an argues that judicial decisions still play 
an im portant function in the constitutional system  as they 
serve to spark (or continue) a broader national discussion about 
constitutional m eaning.188  As a result, the Court acts as the 
shaper and facilitator of society-w ide discussion about 
constitutional values.  When it declares its ow n view s about the 
m eaning of constitutional text, the Court actively channels and 
fosters ongoing societal debate by synthesizing the various, and 
possibly disparate, view s about constitutional m eaning and by 
articulating that debate in an explicitly constitutional form .189  
  
 185 See Barry Friedm an, The Politics of Judicial R eview , 84 TEX . L. REV. 257 
(2005) [hereinafter Friedm an, Politics of Judicial R eview ]; see also Friedm an, D ialogue, 
supra note 27, at $71-72 (“[T]he constraint in  dialogue is inherent and system ic: judges 
are constrained by the system  of governm ent in  w hich they operate.”). 
 18$ Friedm an, D ialogue, supra note 27, at $79 & n .522 (citing ROBERT G. 
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (19$0); Robert A. Dahl, D ecision-
M aking in a D em ocracy: The Suprem e Court as a N ational Policy-M aker, $ J. PUB. L. 
279 (1957)).  The political constraints that operate on  a Suprem e Court Justice in  the 
United States include strategic interaction w ith  other judges on a collegial court, the 
pressures im posed by judges low er in  the judicial hierarchy regarding how  decisions 
are to be interpreted, inter-branch constraints w hich result from  struggles w ith  the 
political branches, and popular opinion regarding constitutional m eaning and the 
practice of judicial review .  See Friedm an, Politics of Judicial Review , supra note 185, 
at 270-329 and the social science references referred to therein. 
 187 Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1295 (“In  
the long run, as popular opinion shifts, judicial decisions and ultim ately constitutional 
m eaning shift w ith  it.”).  See generally Barry Friedm an, M ediated Popular 
Constitutionalism , 101 MICH. L. REV. 259$, 2$13-29 (2003) [hereinafter Friedm an, 
M ediated Popular Constitutionalism ] (exploring the extent to w hich public opinion can, 
and does, serve as a m onitor of judicial activity); Friedm an, Politics of Judicial R eview , 
supra note 185 (sam e). 
 188 Friedm an, D ialogue, supra note 27, at $54 (“The Court m ay offer an 
interpretation that is operative for a tim e, but the Court’s opinions lead debate on  a 
path  that often  ultim ately changes that interpretation.”). 
 189 See, e.g., id. at $$8-71 (describing the various roles of the judiciary in 
constitutional dialogue). 
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In  the process, the Court also m ediates the view s of different 
participants in the debate and focuses the term s in w hich 
future debate m ight proceed.  The Court’s decisions then 
facilitate further debate, either by acting as a catalyst for 
discussion along particular lines or by prodding other 
institutions into deliberative action. 
As a result of these dynam ics, Friedm an describes the 
function of judicial review  in the United States constitutional 
system  as one of prom oting and facilitating constitutional 
dialogue.190  The Court’s participation in this dialogue is 
dynam ic—not only does it spark a process of national 
discussion, but it is also, in turn, affected and shaped by this 
conversation.191  When a decision is rendered it is subject to 
discussion and debate w ithin society.  Over tim e, if there is 
enough popular disagreem ent w ith the Court’s ruling, new  
legislation m ay be passed and legal challenges brought that 
test the finality of the decision in a m ore concrete sense.  As a 
result of this dissent and debate, the Court m ay ultim ately 
com e to reconsider and refashion its decision. Under this 
m odel, the perspectives of non-judicial actors m ay therefore 
influence the Court as m uch, if not m ore, than the Court itself 
influences the rest of society.192  Over tim e, this process 
produces a relatively enduring constitutional equilibrium  that 
is w idely accepted by all the participants in the national 
discussion.  Friedm an further argues that the dialogic role the 
judiciary perform s is a valuable one, as it “achieves the 
separation of constitutional requirem ents from  im m ediate 
political preferences,”193 and, in the long term , the production of 
  
 190 Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1295-9$ 
(“Prom pting, m aintaining, and focusing this debate about constitutional m eaning is the 
prim ary function of judicial review .”); Friedm an, Politics of Judicial R eview , supra note 
185, at 334 (“[J]udicial review  serves to channel and foster societal debate about 
constitutional m eaning.”). 
 191 See Friedm an, D ialogue, supra note 27, at $79 (This “dynam ic tension [is 
w hat] m oves the system  of constitutional interpretation along.”). 
 192 This judicial function is thus different than an educative role, as the Court 
is not the only actor influencing constitutional m eaning.  Cf. Bickel’s theory, supra Part 
III.B.2.i.   
 193 Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1291.  
Friedm an describes this as an im portant aspect of constitutionalism , as the distinction 
betw een the Constitution and ordinary law  m eans, at the very least, that the 
Constitution cannot m ean w hatever the m ajority happens to think it m eans at a 
particular point in  tim e.  Id. at 1297-98; see also Friedm an, M ediated Popular 
Constitutionalism , supra note 187, at 2$02; Barry Friedm an & Scott B. Sm ith, The 
Sedim entary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998) (“The role of constitutional 
interpreter is to reconcile our deepest constitutional com m itm ents, revealed by all of 
our constitutional history, w ith today’s preferences.”). 
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stable and broadly supported answ ers to questions of 
constitutional m eaning.194   
This understanding of how  the institutional dynam ics of 
the constitutional order lead, in the fullness of tim e, to a stable 
equilibrium  about constitutional m eaning echoes the m odel of 
“law  as equilibrium ” that William  Eskridge and Philip Frickey 
have proposed.195  Draw ing on positive political theories of 
institutional interaction, Eskridge and Frickey argue that the 
different branches of governm ent seek “to prom ote [their ow n] 
vision of the public interest.”19$  As a result of the political 
constraints on each branch, that vision can only be achieved 
w ithin a com plex interdependent system  in w hich each branch 
of governm ent com petes and bargains strategically w ith the 
others about their different view s of constitutional m eaning.197  
An understanding of dialogue based on these institutional 
interactions m ight lead one to think that this is another 
com petitive theory of constitutional dialogue.  How ever, the 
focus here is less on how  different institutional actors engage in 
a tussle to prom ote their ow n view s about constitutional 
m eaning, and m ore about how  judicial and non-judicial actors 
com e to learn, debate, and adapt or m odify their view s due to 
their interdependent participation in constitutional dialogue.198   
Relying heavily on positive evidence about the w ays in 
w hich political and social actors respond to the Court, 
Friedm an’s account suggests that concerns about the 
counterm ajoritarian difficulty in the United States are often 
overstated.199  This conclusion is challenged, how ever, by Post 
and Siegel as part of their slightly different description of 
constitutional dialogue as equilibrium .  Utilizing a different 
m ethodology, they suggest that concerns rem ain about the 
possibility of judicial overreaching even under an equilibrium  
theory of dialogue. 
  
 194 Friedm an, M ediated Popular Constitutionalism , supra note 187, at 2$02 
(“[T]he judiciary plays an im portant role in  identifying those constitutional values that 
achieve w idespread support over tim e.  This is not an exclusively judicial role, but 
given the functions perform ed by the different branches this task falls largely on  the 
judiciary.”). 
 195 William  N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Law  as Equilibrium , 108 
HARV. L. REV. 2$, 32 (1994). 
 19$ Id. at 28. 
 197 Id. at 28-29. 
 198 See Friedm an, D ialogue, supra note 27, at $54 (“The process of reaching an 
interpretative consensus on  the [constitutional] text is dynam ic.”). 
 199 Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1272-82. 
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As a m atter of description and as a structural feature of 
the United States constitutional system , Post and Siegel agree 
w ith Friedm an that the Suprem e Court is necessarily engaged 
in a dialogue w ith the “constitutional culture” of the nation 
about constitutional m eaning.200  Their understanding is, 
how ever, based principally on historical and cultural 
exam ples,201 rather than the kinds of positive social science 
evidence on w hich Friedm an relies.202  These rich historical 
exam ples show  that, w hile the Court plays an active role in 
inspiring or facilitating popular understandings of the 
Constitution, changing constitutional understandings of the 
people can also enable the Court “to learn . . . about a better 
w ay to interpret the Constitution.”203 Constitutional law  
pronounced by the Court therefore does not develop in isolation 
from , nor w ithout incorporating, the values and beliefs of non-
judicial actors in society.  As a result, the Court’s decisions w ill 
only acquire ongoing legitim acy if the nation com es to accept 
them  over the long term  and som e period of “relatively secure 
equilibrium ” results.204  Sim ilar to Friedm an, they claim  that 
this system  of constitutional dialogue is norm atively desirable, 
due to the fact that over the longer term  it produces answ ers 
w hich broadly conform  to the constitutional understandings of 
the people. 
Post’s and Siegel’s reliance on historical description 
rather than positive social science evidence has consequences 
in relation to w hat they see as lingering dem ocratic legitim acy 
concerns associated w ith judicial review .  While they argue, on 
  
 200 This has been described in  greatest detail in  Robert Post’s 2002 Suprem e 
Court forew ord.  See Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 11; see 
also Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra note 184, at 1983.  In  using the 
term  “constitutional law ,” Post is referring to “constitutional law  as it is m ade from  the 
perspective of the judiciary.” Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, 
at 8.  “Constitutional culture,” in  contrast, refers m ore specifically to the beliefs and 
values of non-judicial actors about the m eaning of the Constitution.  Id. 
 201 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra note 184, at 
1950 (“History dem onstrates that constitutional law  is in  continual dialogue w ith  the 
constitutional culture of the nation.”).  See also generally Reva B. Siegel, Text in 
Contest: G ender and the Constitution from  a Social M ovem ent Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 297 (2001) (describing stories of the Equal Rights Am endm ent and the 
Nineteenth  Am endm ent as exam ples of the role of a m obilized citizenry in  the m aking 
of Am erican constitutional law ). 
 202 Social science evidence has, how ever, influenced their w ork.  See, e.g., Post, 
Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 35-3$ (discussing the insights of 
political scientists and historians w ho study the Suprem e Court).   
 203 Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra note 184, at 2059. 
 204 Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 107-08.  Post 
thus describes legal authority as developing “diachronically” across tim e.  Id.  
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the one hand, that constitutional dialogue is institutionally 
“inescapable,”205 they nonetheless attribute a great deal of 
pow er to the Court to control the am ount and extent of 
dialogue that takes place in relation to certain issues of vital 
im portance to the nation.  For instance, in their scholarship 
concerning section 5 of the Fourteenth Am endm ent, Post and 
Siegel describe a Court that has stifled constitutional dialogue 
by preventing Congress from  acting on its ow n interpretation of 
constitutional rights.20$  More generally, Post has described the 
Court as constructing a “m em brane” that separates its view s 
about constitutional m eaning from  those of other actors.207  
While the Court generally allow s this m em brane to rem ain 
highly porous so as to facilitate constitutional dialogue, the 
Court can stiffen the m em brane if it form s the view  that 
popular attitudes threaten significant constitutional values.208 
Due to this potential for judicial overreaching, Post and 
Siegel argue that the Court should exercise a degree of self-
restraint w hen perform ing its judicial review  functions.209  If it 
does not, they fear that “the technical legal reason of 
constitutional law  w ill . . . suffocate the political dim ensions of 
the Constitution.”210  A different w ay of understanding this is 
that legal pronouncem ents of judicial suprem acy m ay foster 
social and political beliefs that the judiciary is the ultim ate 
interpreter of the Constitution.  Over the long term , this m ay 
m ean that the political branches of governm ent and the people 
change how  they react to judicial decisions and refrain from  
challenging the Court, thereby dow ngrading their roles in the 
constitutional dialogue and exacerbating dem ocratic legitim acy 
concerns.211 
  
 205 Id. at 9. 
 20$ See generally Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra note 184; 
Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 184. 
 207 Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 9-10, 41 
(describing the “m em brane” betw een constitutional law  and constitutional culture). 
 208 Id. at 41, 49-50. 
 209 Id. at 37 (“The dependence of constitutional law  on  this continuing 
dialogue counsels restraint in  the exercise of judicial review .  This is because the 
legitim acy of judicially fashioned constitutional law  is understood to depend upon its 
grounding in  constitutional culture.” (citation om itted)). 
 210 Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism , supra note 3, at 1041. 
 211 Post and Siegel claim  that this has occurred in  relation to Congress’ pow er 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth  Am endm ent, arguing that Congress has recently 
seem ed “disengaged and possibly confused” about the situations and circum stances in 
w hich it can and should exercise this pow er, due to a series of aggressive rulings by the 
Court.  Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 184, at 43 (citing Neal 
Devins, Congress as Culprit: H ow  Lawm akers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-Congress 
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Although Post and Siegel are right to w orry about the 
issue of judicial overreaching, their concern that this is likely to 
occur in relation to issues of vital im portance to the nation is 
m isplaced.  In  such high saliency cases, the social science 
literature that Friedm an relies on reveals that although the 
Court m ay perceive itself as the ultim ate interpreter of the 
Constitution, this does not m ean that the Court can actively 
control how  non-judicial actors im plem ent or respond to its 
decisions.212  Rather, on a strictly positive account, these cases 
are likely to prom pt national dialogue about constitutional 
m eaning, w hich w ill serve to bring the Court into line over the 
longer term . 
If Post and Siegel directed their attention to low  
saliency cases, how ever, the story about judicial overreaching 
is likely to be different.  The Court m ay be in a better position 
to cem ent its ow n view s on issues of relatively low  political 
salience that are unlikely to engage popular discussion in any 
m eaningful w ay.  In  such cases, the tim e that is needed for 
other actors to respond to the Court m ay bolster m ore assertive 
judicial action.  This highlights the difficulty w ith Friedm an ’s 
account, w hich is that he does not take full account of the 
potential for judicial overreaching in cases that do not engage 
w idespread constitutional discussion.213  If the long term  effects 
of judicial action in these cases are such that non-judicial 
actors increasingly refrain from  challenging the Court, then it 
m ay be true that this account of dialogic judicial review   suffers 
from  lingering dem ocratic debilitation effects.   
While equilibrium  theory does not com pletely resolve 
concerns about the counterm ajoritarian difficulty, it is m ore 
successful than any of the theories previously exam ined in this 
  
Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001)).  In relation to these concerns, see also KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 2, at 233; TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 2, at 194. 
 212 Friedm an suggests, for exam ple, that there is good reason to think that the 
Suprem e Court’s “federalism  revolution,” w hich has been critiqued by Post and Siegel 
as an exam ple of judicial overreaching, is “perfectly consistent w ith  popular opinion.”  
Friedm an, The Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1299.  Friedm an is also 
of the view  that recent judicial decisions tem per concerns that the judiciary is usurping 
pow er w ithin the constitutional system .  Id. at 1298-1302.   
 213 Friedm an does allude to this w hen he states, “Som e judicial decisions do 
strike a national nerve, and w hen they do, they rouse opposition.”  Friedm an, The 
Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1297 (em phasis added); see also 
Friedm an, D ialogue, supra note 27, at $04 n .135 (“[A]ll branches of governm ent likely 
w ill be counterm ajoritarian in  som e instances.  Indeed, the Court m ight confine its 
counterm ajoritarian activity to certain special cases, legitim ating these w ith otherw ise 
frequent reference to m ajority w ill.”). 
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article in positing a substantive dialogic role for the judiciary 
that justifies its involvem ent in judicial review .  Critical to the 
norm ative appeal of these theories is the society-w ide nature of 
dialogue, w hich is rather different than the strictly 
institutional accounts that are found in m ost other theories.214  
The role of channeling and fostering societal discussion 
recognizes that the Court is not sim ply an additional voice in 
constitutional dialogue, but actively engages in a generative 
exchange that ultim ately leads to a settled equilibrium  about 
constitutional m eaning.  This is norm atively desirable because 
the judicial m oderation and facilitation of the contributions of 
different dialogic participants assists in the search for m ore 
w idely accepted and enduring answ ers to questions of 
constitutional m eaning. 
As a m atter of description, w e m ight, how ever, question 
w hether the level of engagem ent of the people in constitutional 
dialogue in the United States is as extensive as this account 
suggests.  For exam ple, there is a large body of em pirical 
evidence that reveals w idespread political apathy am ongst 
citizens in contem porary Am erican society.215  In  recent years, 
citizen interest in politics has declined, together w ith levels of 
popular participation.  Popular input in m any circum stances, 
w hether through elections or social m ovem ents, also appears to 
be lim ited to discrete groups of w ell-educated and w ealthy 
individuals.21$  Nonetheless, the com plete picture rem ains 
unclear because social science data increasingly suggests that 
judicial outcom es tend to fall into line w ith public opinion over 
the longer term , w ith constitutional m eaning also shifting 
accordingly.217  Such evidence does support the recognition of 
the people as participants in constitutional dialogue, even if w e 
do not understand precisely the w ays in w hich they influence 
  
 214 See Friedm an, D ialogue, supra note 27, at $58 n .410 (“I differ w ith  – or 
m ove a step past – Fisher in  that I believe that all branches facilitate a dialogue in  
w hich the people give content to the constitutional text.”).  Devins and Fisher do 
contem plate a greater role for the people in  their recent w ork.  See DEVINS & FISHER, 
supra note 29, at $; Devins & Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity, supra note 95, at 94-98, 104.  
Nonetheless, they still preserve the m ost im portant roles in  constitutional dialogue to 
the three branches of governm ent, due to the basis of their theory in  coordinate 
construction and institutional checks and balances.  
 215 See Doni Gew irtzm an, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism , N ostalgia, 
and the True N ature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 913 (2005) (exam ining 
em pirical research w hich suggests that “the People have little interest in increased 
civic responsibility or greater popular accountability in  politics”). 
 21$ Id. at 931 & n.251 (citing em pirical studies w hich suggest that “[w ]ealth 
and education are the strongest predictors of political participation”). 
 217 See supra note 202 and accom panying text. 
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constitutional debate.  Given the evidence of grow ing civic 
disengagem ent, how ever, w e should also think about practical 
strategies that w ould enable the view s of the citizenry to be 
incorporated m ore com pletely into constitutional dialogue in 
the future. 
Even if som e aspects of the people’s positive role in the 
Am erican system  fail to be com pletely understood, the 
norm ative desirability of connecting debate and discussion 
about constitutional values to broader society is clear.  This is 
closely linked to a particular understanding of 
constitutionalism  that view s the Constitution not only as a 
docum ent of positive law  that creates governm ent institutions 
and defines rules of governm ental behavior, but also as an 
“expression of the deepest beliefs and convictions of 
the . . . nation, of our ‘fundam ental principles as they have been 
understood by the traditions of our people and our law .’”218  One 
of the functions of a Constitution is to constitute the character 
and sensibilities of a nation, allow ing for the possibility of self-
revision and transform ation over tim e as the nation ’s self-
understanding grow s and changes.219  As Hanna Pitkin has 
said, “[I]n  this sense, our constitution is less som ething w e 
have than som ething w e are . . . .  This sense of ‘constitution,’ 
then, is activating and em pow ering, calling us to our pow ers as 
co-founders and to our responsibilities.”220 
An analogy can be draw n betw een this understanding of 
constitutionalism  and argum ents m ade in various nations 
regarding the effect of entrenching hum an rights guarantees in 
national law .  Com m entators have suggested that one of the 
m ost im portant effects of the entrenchm ent of fundam ental 
  
 218 Com pare Post, Xashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 184, at 3$ 
(quoting Lochner v. New  York, 198 U.S. 45, 7$ (1905) (Holm es, J., dissenting)), w ith 
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 4$-50 (1988), and Sanford Levinson, 
Constitutional Protestantism  in Theory and Practice: Tw o Q uestions for M ichael Stokes 
Paulsen and O ne for H is Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373, 37$ (1994) (Levinson offers a 
contrasting view  regarding the necessity of active, independent constitutional 
interpretation by citizens.). 
 219 Mark Tushnet refers to this as expressivism .  Mark Tushnet, The 
Possibilities of Com parative Constitutional Law , 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 12$9-85 (1999); 
see also Mark Tushnet, Xidelity as Synthesis: Constituting W e the People, $5 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1997) (“A people can be constituted in  m any w ays.  But any one 
people is historically constituted in  only one w ay.  And here is w here constitutional law  
com es in.”). 
 220 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1$7, 
1$7-$8 (1987); see also Roger Cotterrell, The Sym bolism  of Constitutions: Som e Anglo-
Am erican Com parisons, in A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP*: AMERICAN INFLUENCES ON 
PUBLIC LAW IN THE UK 25 (Ian Loveland ed., 1995). 
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rights is to create a hum an rights culture that provides a value 
system  by w hich a society lives and conducts itself.221  In  order 
to achieve this deep culture of respect for rights, hum an rights 
values m ust be effectively internalized by all m em bers of a 
society.222  The best w ay to achieve this and to foster the 
legitim acy of constitutional com m itm ents to rights as 
im portant expressions of a nation ’s self-understanding m ay 
w ell be adapting or designing system s of constitutional 
dialogue in a w ay that recognizes the central place of the 
people in ongoing discussion about fundam ental values.223  This 
is also likely to foster greater confidence am ong m em bers of the 
populace that they can have a legitim ate voice in the debate 
about constitutional m eaning and change w ithin their society. 
While this account has great norm ative appeal as a w ay 
of understanding constitutional dialogue, it ultim ately fails to 
provide a com plete account of the role of judicial review  in 
dem ocratic constitutionalism .  In  this regard, w e first need to 
ask w hether sim ilar dialogic dynam ics are likely to be 
observable or achievable in constitutional system s outside the 
United States.  If they are not, then this account is unlikely to 
provide a norm atively satisfying vision of constitutionalism  
  
 221 See FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES FOR A GODLESS AGE:  THE STORY OF THE 
UK’S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS 213 (2000) (“It is not possible in  a dem ocracy to attem pt to 
create a hum an rights culture w ithout involving the people in  its form ation.  And it is 
sim ply not sustainable to pin so m uch on  the idea of hum an rights . . . w ithout 
w idespread participation in developing its m eaning and scope.”).   
 222 As one com m entator has stated, “[h]istory and experience suggest that, to 
be effective, a bill of rights m ust be em bedded in  a culture of dem ocratic 
constitutionalism ” and a m ore effective national schem e of rights protection m ay be 
achievable w hen it involves the com m unity that the bill of rights is designed to serve.  
George William s, Constructing a Com m unity-Based Bill of R ights, in PROTECTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS: INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 53, at 247, 249.  Cf. 
Cheryl Saunders, Protecting R ights in Com m on Law  Constitutional System s: A 
Xram ew ork for a Com parative Study, 53 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 83, 95 
(2002) (“The rights instrum ents and the debate associated w ith  their operation in 
practice . . . have a potential educative effect for the com m unity as a w hole, and thus, 
m ay contribute to the developm ent of civil society.”). 
 223 This understanding of the position of the people w ithin the constitutional 
system  can be contrasted w ith that proposed by Bruce Ackerm an.  See 1 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 10 (1991).  Ackerm an argues that 
constitutional m eaning is determ ined by the people in  rare m om ents of “higher 
law m aking,” and that the role of the judiciary is to “protect[] the hard-w on principles of 
a m obilized citizenry against erosion by political elites w ho have failed to gain broad 
and deep popular support for their innovations.”  Id. at 10.  The understanding of 
dialogue discussed here proposes a m ore direct role for the people in  determ ining 
constitutional m eaning, not only at tim es of “higher law m aking,” but also during 
periods of “norm al law m aking.”  See id. at 299-301 (distinguishing betw een “higher 
law m aking” and “norm al law m aking”). 
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that has general appeal, even if it succeeds in providing this in 
relation to the United States system . 
In  this regard, Mark Tushnet has suggested that this 
form  of long-term  dialogue is a unique feature of the Am erican 
system .  According to Tushnet, this is because the process of 
dialogue in the United States is necessarily m ore inform al and 
extended in tim e than in countries, such as Canada, w here 
direct institutional m echanism s exist for the political branches 
to challenge judicial decisions.224  Conversely, he argues that a 
different kind of short-term  dialogue is m ore likely in Canada, 
due to the ability of the political branches to m ore rapidly 
override or revise judicial decisions.225 
While the specific course of institutional interactions in 
the United States and Canada is certainly likely to be affected 
by differences in the structural m echanism s that exist in those 
countries, this does not m ean that broader dialogue about 
constitutional values involving the people does not, or could 
not, occur w ithin the Canadian constitutional system .  As a 
result, even if a form  of shorter term  institutional dialogue 
takes place in specific cases due to the structural features of 
the Canadian Charter, longer term  society-w ide dialogue m ay 
still take place betw een the Court, the political branches, and 
the people regarding the m eaning of the broad constitutional 
values that arise in those cases.  Indeed, rather than view ing 
these interactions as different form s of dialogue, the better 
view  is that they are different aspects of the sam e dialogue, as 
the specific institutional interactions that take place in the 
context of individual cases can, in due course, form  part of a 
broader societal dialogue about constitutional m eaning.  
Ultim ately, the extent to w hich dialogue takes place in this 
form  in Canada, or in other countries, w ill depend on the 
positive dynam ics of those constitutional system s.22$  How ever, 
  
 224 See, e.g., Tushnet, Constitutional Patriotism , supra note 57 (distinguishing 
betw een dialogue in  w eak and strong form  system s of judicial review , in  part, on  the 
basis of the tim e over w hich the dialogue is likely to take place). 
 225 Tushnet rem ains skeptical, how ever, regarding w hether even short-term  
dialogue really exists as a m atter of description in  Canada, given the apparent 
delegitim ization of the override.  See, e.g., Tushnet, Alternative Xorm s of Judicial 
R eview , supra note 71; Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison  Around the W orld, 71 
TENN. L. REV. 251, 2$4-74 (2004). 
 22$ Whether dialogue presently takes place in  this form  in  Canada is presently 
uncertain, given the relative dearth  of political science literature on  such issues.  One 
recent exception w hich takes a broader positive analysis of dialogue in  Canada focuses 
on  the nature of dialogue in  Canada betw een the federal governm ent and the low er 
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given that there is nothing in principle that suggests that these 
dynam ics cannot exist in other nations, this account of dialogue 
does have the potential to provide a norm atively satisfying 
vision of constitutionalism  outside, as w ell as inside, the 
United States. 
This discussion nonetheless points to a different reason 
w hy the equilibrium  m odel rem ains an incom plete 
understanding of the role of judicial review  in m odern 
constitutionalism .  Paradoxically, this also relates to the 
m odel’s focus on form s of dialogue that engage society as a 
w hole.  Although it has been argued that broadening the focus 
to society-w ide dialogue is a significant theoretical 
contribution, the singular nature of this focus underplays the 
institutional aspects of constitutional dialogue.  Furtherm ore, 
there is a vital need for a supplem ental account of how  
constitutional dialogue does, or can, proceed at the institutional 
level betw een the judiciary and the political branches of 
governm ent, given that society-w ide dialogue is unlikely to 
take place in relation to a range of constitutional issues of 
relatively low  political salience.227  Fortunately, there rem ains 
one account of constitutional dialogue that can assist us in this 
regard. 
4. Partnership Theories 
The partnership m odel of dialogue centers on the 
recognition that the differently situated branches of 
governm ent can m ake distinct contributions to constitutional 
dialogue in a w ay that does not privilege the judicial role.  This 
account recognizes that each branch of governm ent learns from  
the specific dialogic inputs of the other branches in an 
  
courts.  See Matthew  A. Hennigar, Expanding the ‘D ialogue’ D ebate: Canadian Xederal 
G overnm ent Responses to Low er Court Charter D ecisions, 37 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 3 (2004). 
 227 Friedm an suggests that the Court renders decisions in “explicitly 
constitutional term s,” but this does not, in  itself, articulate any m ore distinctive 
institutional com petences that the Court brings to its dialogic role. See Friedm an, The 
Im portance of Being Positive, supra note 148, at 1291.  In  contrast, Post and Siegel do 
recognize “institutionally differentiated w ays” in  w hich the judiciary and the political 
branches engage in  constitutional discussion.  Post & Siegel, Legislative 
Constitutionalism , supra note 184, at 198$.  For exam ple, they consider that courts 
have the institutionally specific role of defining and enforcing rights in  particular cases 
in  the procedural context of adjudication, w hereas Congress derives its specific 
institutional com petences from  its dem ocratic responsiveness.  See, e.g., id. at 19$$-$7, 
1970.  Their explanation of dialogue, how ever, centers to a greater extent on  broader 
dialogue w ith  the constitutional culture of a nation, rather than on  these institutional 
aspects. 
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institutionally diverse constitutional order.228  Judicial and non-
judicial actors are thus conceived as equal participants in 
constitutional decision-m aking, both of w hom  dialogically 
contribute to the search for better answ ers as a result of their 
unique institutional perspectives.229 
The m ost prom inent account of constitutional dialogue 
as partnership in this institutional vein has been proposed by 
Janet Hiebert in the context of the Canadian Charter, though 
her view s about institutional interactions can be applied m ore 
generally to the United States and other nations.230  Hiebert 
begins w ith the claim  that both courts and legislatures share 
responsibility for m aking judgm ents about constitutional 
values and for assessing the reasonableness of their ow n 
actions in light of those values.231  This focus on legislative, as 
w ell as judicial, responsibility is im portant because it 
recognizes that not all legislation w ill be subject to challenge 
before the courts.  If legislatures did not engage in their ow n 
  
 228 Cf. Keith E. Whittington, In D efense of Legislatures, 28 POL. THEORY $90, 
$97 (2000) (“[I]nstitutions . . . develop distinct m issions, cultures, m odes of behavior, 
norm s, and such, w hich affect both  the behavior of individuals w ithin those institutions 
and their collective output.”). 
 229 While a num ber of theorists of constitutional dialogue describe their 
theories as “partnership” theories, it is questionable w hether these are truly 
partnership theories in  the term s in  w hich that expression is used in  this Article.  Tsvi 
Kahana, for exam ple, has developed a self-described partnership approach as part of 
his goal of providing a theoretical justification for the existence and use of the override 
provision in  the Canadian Charter.  See Tsvi Kahana, U nderstanding the 
N otw ithstanding M echanism , 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 221, 255-5$ (2002).  Kahana 
conceives of the Court’s role as one of deliberation and of prom oting discussion and 
debate about constitutional m eaning, but also posits an additional unique contribution 
that judges can m ake to constitutional dialogue, due to the fact that courts have the 
specialized capacity to “interpret[] texts, specify[] ideas, and offer[] legal reasoning,” 
w hereas legislatures do not.  Id. at 250.  As a result of these special legal skills, the 
legislature can read decisions of the Court and learn from  judicial deliberations, 
allow ing it to subsequently conduct its ow n deliberation in  those term s.  How ever, 
Kahana does not consider w hether the legislature has a different and equally 
im portant perspective to offer in  the dialogue about constitutional m eaning, as he 
ultim ately considers that w hile legislatures and courts are equally m otivated to 
interpret the Constitution, courts are m ore com petent to engage in  constitutional 
interpretation than legislatures.  Id.  As a result, Kahana’s attem pts to justify an 
additional, institutionally specific role for the judiciary and the legislature in 
constitutional dialogue thus continue to privilege the ability of judges to interpret the 
Constitution, leading to another rather judicial-centric and unequal account of 
constitutional dialogue w hich it is difficult to call a “partnership” m odel. 
 230 HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 50-72; see also Hiebert, 
Parliam ent and R ights, supra note 53; Janet L. Hiebert, N ew  Constitutional Ideas: Can 
N ew  Parliam entary M odels R esist Judicial D om inance W hen Interpreting R ights?, 82 
TEX . L. REV. 19$3 (2004) [hereinafter Hiebert, N ew  Constitutional Ideas] (discussing 
both  the Canadian Charter and the United Kingdom  Hum an Rights Act). 
 231 See, e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 52 (“[E]ach body 
[m ust] satisfy itself that its judgm ent respects Charter values.”). 
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independent interpretation of constitutional values, then the 
overriding goal of constitutionalism , nam ely “ensuring that 
state actions are consistent w ith its norm ative values,” m ay not 
be com pletely realized.232  While courts and legislatures share 
responsibility for respecting constitutional values, each has a 
“distinct relationship” to a constitutional conflict.233  This is not 
only because they are differently situated, but also because 
they each bring distinct and valuable perspectives to 
constitutional judgm ent given their different institutional 
characteristics and responsibilities.234 
Hiebert describes a num ber of distinct perspectives and 
abilities that judges and legislatures bring to constitutional 
judgm ents.  In  relation to the judiciary, she rejects the view  
that courts are better able to resolve disagreem ents about the 
m eaning of rights in a principled m anner.235  She does 
nevertheless consider that the relative insulation of judges 
from  political and social pressures gives them  a greater degree 
of freedom  to identify circum stances in w hich legislative goals 
unduly restrict rights or have unintentional consequences that 
unnecessarily restrict rights.23$  In  addition, interpreting and 
defining rights is at the core of judicial decision-m aking 
because it is a task that judges regularly and deliberately 
perform .237 
Hiebert also argues that there are distinct 
disadvantages w ith the judicial role, w hich m eans that judges 
can actively learn from  the legislature’s different perspective.  
  
 232 Id. at 220. 
 233 Id. at 51. 
 234 See, e.g., Hiebert, Parliam ent and R ights, supra note 53, at 239 (“The tw o 
institutions share responsibility for evaluating the m erits of legislative choices and 
bring to their respective judgm ents different perspectives that reflect their distinctive 
roles and the fact that they are situated differently, relative to the Charter conflict.”). 
 235 See, e.g., HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 54 (“The 
proposition that only judges are capable of m aking conscious and principled decisions 
w here rights are affected underestim ates the extent to w hich Charter evaluation has 
becom e an intrinsic part of the policy process.”). 
 23$ Id. at xii. 
 237 Id. at 53.  Hiebert does, how ever, argue that the Court has a particular 
responsibility in  its dialogic interactions w ith  the legislature in  relation to w hat she 
term s “core rights” under the Charter, w hich she describes as the “broad range of 
requirem ents necessary for the people to govern them selves in  a representative 
system .”  Id. at 57.  While she does not claim  that the judiciary has special abilities in 
relation to interpreting these rights, she does consider that courts have a special 
responsibility to ensure that Parliam ent has taken such rights seriously.  Id. at $9-70.  
This part of Hiebert’s analysis can be criticized, as it appears to assum e that courts 
indeed perform  a m ore principled role in  relation to such issues.  The theory rem ains 
coherent as a theory of constitutional dialogue, how ever, w ithout this added elem ent. 
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In  this regard, the legislative branch has an advantage in 
addressing the question of w hen the pursuit of policy objectives 
m ight necessitate the restriction of rights, given its access to 
resources and the policy expertise that exists w ithin the 
political branches of governm ent.  In  contrast to judicial 
decisions, policy decisions are based upon “specialized 
expertise, relevant inform ation and data, previous trials and 
failures, com parative experience, and inform ed best 
estim ates.”238  Accordingly, although the legislature m ight 
benefit from  a w ell-reasoned judicial decision w hen 
determ ining w hether its objectives are sufficiently im portant to 
justify any lim itation of rights, this judicial input should not be 
privileged and should “not replace political judgm ent.”239 
As a result of these distinct perspectives and their 
“separate yet interconnected” positions in the constitutional 
order, the judiciary and the legislature are able to engage in a 
dialogue about constitutional m eaning, in w hich both should 
exercise m odesty about their ow n conclusions and listen to and 
learn from  each other’s perspectives, m odifying their ow n view s 
accordingly.240  In  the Canadian context, this potential for 
institutional dialogue can be realized in a num ber of different 
w ays.  First, Hiebert suggests that dialogue begins w ith 
legislators in m ost circum stances w hen they initially consider 
w hether legislation is consistent w ith the Charter. It then 
continues in the context of individual cases, w here the 
deliberations of the legislature are conveyed through legal 
argum ent and w here the deliberations of the court are revealed 
through its judgm ents, w ith both parties learning from  each 
  
 238 Hiebert, Parliam ent and R ights, supra note 53, at 240. 
 239 Id. at 239.  Hiebert also considers that any form  of interaction in  w hich the 
judicial voice is privileged is not healthy for the institution of dem ocratic governm ent, 
as this w ould dim inish “political responsibility to pursue im portant policy goals and 
m ay lead to the unnecessary use of non-am bitious or ineffective m eans to pursue these 
objectives.” HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at xiii. 
 240 HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 51.  Hiebert previously 
referred to the m etaphors of dialogue and conversation to describe her preferred form s 
of interaction betw een courts and legislatures in the Canadian context.  See JANET L. 
HIEBERT, LIMITING RIGHTS: THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 124-25, 154-55 (199$); 
Janet L. Hiebert, W hy M ust a Bill of R ights be a Contest of Political W ills? The 
Canadian Alternative, 10 PUB. L. REV. 22 (1999); HIEBERT, ENRICHING 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE, supra note 155, at 1.  She has now  revised her view s 
slightly and refers to her theory as a “relational approach.”  HIEBERT, CHARTER 
CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 50-51.  While her term inology has changed, the theory 
can still be regarded as a “dialogue” theory, as the general thrust of her view s about 
the institutional interactions that should take place betw een the judiciary and 
legislatures in Canada rem ain the sam e. 
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others’ view s.241  The dialogue then returns to the legislature, 
w hich considers if and how  to respond to the court’s decision.  
This approach also leaves space for the legislature to m ake use 
of the section 33 override in cases w here the judiciary has 
nullified legislation on Charter grounds.242  In  such 
circum stances, the legislature m ay consider the view s of the 
judiciary, w hile at the sam e m aking its ow n principled 
assessm ent about how  the rights in question should best be 
protected. 
Although Hiebert ties her account of dialogue to the 
Canadian Charter, there is no reason w hy this w ay of 
understanding institutional interactions cannot be extended to 
other nations, including the United States, because the positive 
features of the judicial and legislative processes that she 
describes w ill be closely analogous in m ost constitutional 
system s.  In  the United States, the fact that the political 
branches of governm ent appear before the Suprem e Court in 
constitutional cases and can respond to judicial decisions w ith 
w hich they disagree in a variety of w ays highlights that the 
potential for the different branches to engage in a productive 
partnership exists in this system .  As a result, the partnership 
m odel dem onstrates that the potential exists for institutional 
“conversations occurring in both directions,” w hich have the 
potential to “ratchet up” the degree and quality of the scrutiny 
that is brought to bear on the consideration of how  legislative 
actions im pact constitutional rights.243  
Com pared to theories discussed previously w hich refer 
to a special dialogic role for the judiciary in relation to m atters 
of principle, the institutionally distinct roles of the judiciary in 
partnership w ith the legislature that Hiebert proposes are 
som ew hat m ore m odest.  How ever, they are also m ore realistic, 
given that they are based on positive features of the judicial 
and legislative processes.  In  addition, they recognize that the 
  
 241 HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 50-51. 
 242 Hiebert considers that the override should only be used follow ing a 
decision by the country’s highest court, as otherw ise the Suprem e Court’s contribution 
w ould be om itted from  constitutional deliberations.  Id. at $3.  This view  about 
confining the use of the override to situations in  w hich the Suprem e Court has had an 
opportunity to speak is shared by other com m entators.  See, e.g., ROACH, THE SUPREME 
COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 4, 28$-87; Kahana, The N otw ithstanding M echanism , 
supra note 34.  
 243 Hiebert, Parliam ent and R ights, supra note 53, at 239 (“The Charter’s 
virtue lies in  its capacity to ‘ratchet up’ the quality of scrutiny that is brought to bear 
on  the validity of governm ental action, not in  its prom ise for judicial resolution of 
legislative conflicts involving rights.”). 
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judiciary has an im portant adjudicative function to perform  in 
disputes about rights, but refuse to m ake em pirically 
questionable assum ptions244 about the m oral superiority of the 
judicial process.245 
This account also offers a unique w ay of overcom ing the 
counterm ajoritarian difficulty at the institutional level, due to 
the fact that it does not privilege the judicial role in 
constitutional dialogue and leaves sufficient space for the 
political branches to w ork out dem ocratic resolutions to 
constitutional issues.  This is, how ever, a prescriptive vision of 
how  dialogue should proceed, albeit one w hich is firm ly 
grounded in the positive features of the constitutional system .  
As a result, there rem ains som e risk that legislatures m ay not 
be able to fully live up to their dialogic role in practice, and 
m ay instead gradually com e to defer to judicial 
pronouncem ents about constitutional m eaning over tim e.  As 
observed previously in relation to process-centered rules, 
legislatures m ay encounter substantial difficulty in revisiting 
earlier decisions due to the practical realities and tim e 
constraints inherent in the legislative process.24$  Furtherm ore, 
Hiebert herself increasingly questions w hether this vision of 
constitutional dialogue is fully achievable in Canada, despite 
the existence of express institutional m echanism s such as the 
section 33 override, because the political culture in Canada 
does not fully accept the legitim acy of political judgm ents about 
rights that differ from  judicial interpretations.247  Therefore, if 
this vision of constitutional dialogue is to becom e a com plete 
reality, it w ill be necessary to think about how  w ays to 
structure the political branches, or the rules under w hich they 
operate, to enhance their abilities to participate in the 
resolution of constitutional issues. 
On the norm ative level, the partnership conception of 
constitutional dialogue is w orth pursuing because it provides 
one of the m ore satisfying accounts of the dialogic judicial role 
that w e have encountered thus far.  Of particular im portance, 
it proposes a special and valuable judicial role, w hich 
recognizes that judges m ake unique institutional contributions 
to dialogue in individual cases as a result of the unique 
  
 244 See supra notes 53-57, 141-150 and accom panying text. 
 245 Cf. supra Part III.B.2. 
 24$ See supra Part II.A.2. 
 247 See Hiebert, N ew  Constitutional Ideas, supra note 230 (discussing this 
problem  in  relation to both  Canada and the United Kingdom ). 
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features of the adjudicative process. This conception of the 
judicial role also ensures that the judiciary’s contributions are 
not privileged over the distinct dialogic contributions that 
legislatures are able to m ake.  How ever, this vision of dialogue 
also rem ains incom plete because it restricts its focus to form s 
of institutional dialogue betw een the branches of governm ent.  
The incom pleteness that exists here is the converse of that 
identified in relation to the equilibrium  m odel, w hich directed 
greater attention to the society-w ide aspects of dialogue.  As 
observed in relation to that m odel, w e need to exam ine both the 
institutional and broader society-w ide aspects of constitutional 
dialogue in order to achieve the m ost norm atively satisfying 
understanding of the role of judicial review  in m odern society.  
This suggests that a synthesis betw een these m ost prom ising 
institutional and society-w ide accounts of constitutional 
dialogue is the best w ay to proceed w ith the dialogic project. 
IV. DIALOGIC FUSION 
The m ost prom ising vision of constitutional dialogue, 
and, consequently, the strongest norm ative account of the role 
of judicial review  in m odern constitutionalism  em erge w hen the 
equilibrium  and partnership understandings of dialogue are 
com bined.  On the one hand, this synthesis helps resolve 
lingering dem ocratic legitim acy concerns w ith the partnership 
m odel.248  More im portantly, this dual-track vision enables a 
m ore com prehensive understanding of the different 
institutional and social aspects of constitutional dialogue, and 
of the various unique w ays in w hich different actors participate 
in the search for constitutional m eaning.  
The value of incorporating the equilibrium  account into 
a com prehensive understanding of constitutional dialogue 
results from  its conception of the judicial role as one of 
facilitating and fostering society-w ide constitutional discussion 
and debate.  As w e have seen, this account has significant 
norm ative prom ise because it enables us to understand how  
m ore enduring and w idely accepted answ ers can em erge 
through the process of society-w ide constitutional discussion.  
The equilibrium  account is also valuable due to its inclusion of 
the people as dialogic partners and its recognition of the 
im portance of involving the citizenry in ongoing debate about 
  
 248 See supra notes 204-205 and accom panying text. 
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constitutional m eaning and change w ithin society.  Despite 
these positive features, how ever, the equilibrium  account does 
not succeed com pletely in resolving the counterm ajoritarian 
concerns associated w ith judicial review , given that cases of 
relatively low  political salience are unlikely to engage society-
w ide discussion.  In  addition, the account rem ains incom plete 
because it cannot explain fully the institutional aspects of 
constitutional dialogue. 
These lingering difficulties w ith the equilibrium  m odel 
are overcom e by synthesizing its understanding of dialogue 
w ith that encom passed in the partnership m odel. As discussed 
in the previous Part, the partnership account of dialogue 
proposes that judges and legislatures bring unique 
institutional perspectives to the consideration of constitutional 
m eaning due to their “separate yet interconnected” positions in 
the constitutional order.  If the branches listen and learn from  
one another’s differing perspectives on constitutional m eaning, 
then better answ ers w ill be arrived at in individual cases.  The 
dynam ic fusion of these tw o understandings highlights that 
judges can both facilitate constitutional discussion at a society-
w ide level and m ake unique institutional contributions to the 
consideration of constitutional values in the context of 
individual cases.  In  turn, judges can also respond dialogically 
at the level of individual cases to the distinctive contributions 
of the legislature in relation to constitutional m eaning, and to 
the developing view s of broader constitutional culture.  On this 
dual-track understanding of constitutional dialogue, there are 
tw o distinct aspects to the role of judicial review  in m odern 
society.  First, judicial review  assists in the production of m ore 
durable and w idely accepted answ ers to constitutional issues 
that engage society as a w hole.  Second, judicial review  also 
aids the im proved institutional resolution of constitutional 
questions at the level of individual cases, due to the unique 
perspectives provided by judges and the political branches of 
governm ent in dialogue w ith one another.  In  turn, these inter-
branch interactions also form  part of any society-w ide dialogue 
that takes place.  In  the context of pervasive yet reasonable 
disagreem ent about the m eaning of rights, this com bined 
understanding offers the best chance of producing answ ers to 
constitutional questions that are not only satisfying in the 
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context of the resolution of individual cases, but w hich are also 
satisfying to the citizenry as a w hole.249   
This novel w ay of understanding the role of judicial 
review  opens a num ber of avenues for future research in the 
field of constitutional theory.  The principal area of inquiry 
that should be pursued relates to how  w e m ight foster both the 
institutional and the broader social aspects of this vision of 
dialogue w ithin the United States and abroad.  In  relation to 
the society-w ide aspects of constitutional discussion, it rem ains 
im portant in the United States to think about practical 
strategies that w ill enable the view s of the citizenry to be 
incorporated m ore com pletely into constitutional dialogue, due 
to the evidence of grow ing civic disengagem ent.250  Outside the 
United States, the extent to w hich the judiciary actually 
facilitates society-w ide debate is uncertain in m any nations, 
due to the lack of positive evidence about these issues.  In 
relation to those system s, it w ill first be im portant to exam ine 
the extent to w hich these broad dialogic dynam ics currently 
exist, before beginning to think about the best w ays to m odify 
or adapt these system s in order to incorporate m ore com pletely 
the judicial role of facilitating broader constitutional 
discussion.251 
In  relation to the institutional aspects of constitutional 
dialogue, w e need to consider in further detail the range of 
institutionally distinct contributions that the judicial and 
legislative branches bring to the dialogue.  Once this is done, 
w e should also consider w ays in w hich these different 
contributions can best be harnessed in order to facilitate a 
greater degree of institutional dialogue as partnership.  In  this 
regard and draw ing on Hiebert’s description, w e can propose a 
broader range of institutionally distinct contributions that the 
judicial and legislative branches are able to bring to the process 
of constitutional dialogue.  
The legislative branch has distinct advantages in 
institutional dialogue in dealing w ith polycentric issues and in 
considering how  to balance the pursuit of policy objectives w ith 
  
 249 Cf. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 53, 
at 84$ (“In  the context of reasonable disagreem ent, it seem s appropriate to allow  broad 
participation in  the decision as to the content of our principles rather than rem ove that 
decision to an elite institution that w ill then seek to im pose its ruling on , or against, 
the people at large.”). 
 250 See supra Part III.B.3. 
 251 See supra notes 207-208. 
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the recognition and protection of constitutional rights.252  The 
com parative ability of legislatures to m ake these judgm ents 
rests on the superior fact-gathering capabilities and specialized 
policy expertise of the political branches.  These capabilities 
also m ean that legislatures are able to act positively to protect 
rights and to experim ent w ith rights protection and 
enforcem ent in w ays that extend beyond the rem edial pow er of 
the judiciary.253  In  short, legislatures have distinct advantages 
in considering how  the protection and interpretation of 
constitutional rights fits into the “big picture” of political 
decision-m aking for the benefit of society as a w hole. 
This broad focus nonetheless m eans that the individual 
effects of legislation m ay not alw ays be readily apparent in the 
drafting process.  It is also unlikely that legislatures w ill focus 
on the individual effects of statutes to any significant extent 
due to the fact that m odern legislation tends to be enacted in 
open-ended and general term s.  As Victor Ferreres has 
observed, this can be traced to the fact that it is increasingly 
difficult to achieve consensus around specific rules as a result 
of incentives for legislative com prom ise and decision-m aking by 
voting.254  In  these circum stances, the judiciary perform s an 
im portant im plem entation function by considering the concrete 
consequences of statutes in the context of the facts of particular 
cases.  In  so doing, the judiciary is able to highlight the 
individualized effects of legislation that m ay have gone 
unobserved by the legislature.  The judiciary therefore has a 
com parative advantage in being able to highlight the “sm all 
picture” regarding the legal or constitutional consequences of 
legislation in specific cases.255 
The judiciary also perform s a special institutional 
function due to its com parative tem poral advantage in 
  
 252 See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Xorm s and Lim its of Adjudication, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (discussing the nature of polycentric inquiries). 
 253 Post and Siegel recognize that Congress can establish com prehensive 
regulatory and adm inistrative schem es to enhance the protection of constitutional 
rights, w hich go beyond the bounds of the rem edial pow er of the judiciary.  See Post & 
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism , supra note 184, at 2007. 
 254 See Victor Ferreres Com ella, The European M odel of Constitutional R eview  
of Legislation: Tow ard D ecentralization?, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 4$1, 471-72 (2004); see 
also id. at 472 (regarding the judiciary fitting “the pragm atic needs of m odern society”). 
 255 Cf. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 53, 
at 84$ (suggesting that “[t]he judiciary’s m ost useful role m ay be in  fram ing 
constitutional disputes for extrajudicial resolution and in  enforcing the principled 
decisions reached elsew here rather than in  autonom ously and authoritatively defining 
constitutional m eaning”). 
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ensuring that sufficient attention is paid to constitutional 
values. As previously observed, w hile recognizing that 
legislatures are m otivated and com petent to engage in 
constitutional interpretation, the reality of the legislative 
process m eans that legislators m ay not alw ays have sufficient 
tim e to devote to com plete constitutional exegesis on every 
issue.25$  Legislators have a variety of roles to perform  in 
addition to their function of enacting legislation, such as party 
functions, m eeting w ith constituents, and overseeing 
governm ent adm inistration, w hich m ay som etim es draw  them  
aw ay from  core legislating.257  Furtherm ore, the legislature’s 
need to confront seem ingly urgent issues m ay som etim es result 
in hastily enacted law s, w ithout sufficient attention paid to 
m easures that m ay unduly restrict rights.  Without 
succum bing to generalized fears about legislative expediency 
and self-interest, judges can help ensure that sufficient 
legislative attention is paid to constitutional values.  Judges 
are able to assist in this w ay because they often have m ore 
tim e to devote to this task w ithout the im m ediate pressure of 
conflicting incentives in the context of their dispute resolution 
function.258  In  com m on law  system s, the judiciary’s ability to 
m ake this contribution is bolstered by procedures, such as 
certiorari and the ability to avoid constitutional questions 
w here ordinary legal grounds of decision are available, w hich 
enable the Court to decide w hich, and how  m any, constitutional 
cases it w ill focus on in detail.259 
  
 25$ See supra Part III.A.2. 
 257 See, e.g., Keith  E. Whittington, An “Indispensable Xeature”? 
Constitutionalism  and Judicial R eview , $ N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 27 (2002) 
(“Legislators have m ultiple roles to fulfill, in  addition to m aking law , that include 
overseeing governm ent adm inistration and serving constituents.  As a consequence, 
the legislature m ay not alw ays give sufficient attention to particular concerns such as 
civil liberties.  In  passing specific law s, therefore, it m ay m ake sense for courts to insist 
on  som e further dem onstration from  legislatures that they have perform ed their 
legislative role properly . . . .”). 
 258 Janet Hiebert focuses on this issue in  developing her relational approach, 
arguing that judicial decisions can legitim ately encourage legislatures “to give m ore 
sensitivity and thought” to how  they propose to accom plish legislative objectives.  See 
HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS, supra note $9, at 70-71.  In  essence, this approach 
involves the use of process-centered rules, such as those discussed in  Part III.A.2.  
Ideally, w hen thinking about institutional design, w e m ight w ant to structure a system  
so that the chances of legislative haste or thoughtlessness are m inim ized.  To the 
extent that this is not possible, how ever, som e utility in  process-centered rules under a 
structural understanding of constitutional dialogue m ay rem ain. 
 259 See generally Victor Ferreres Com ella, The Consequences of Centralizing 
Judicial Review  in a Special Court: Som e Thoughts on Judicial Activism , 82 TEX . L. 
REV. 1705 (2004).   
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With these institutionally distinct roles in m ind, further 
research should be undertaken in order to understand how  best 
to design or structure institutions in order to foster 
institutional dialogue grounded in these differing 
contributions.  In  m any national settings, including the United 
States, this could be achieved by m odifying the rules through 
w hich the operations of the judiciary and the political branches 
are arranged.2$0  In  other countries, this m ight also involve 
aspects of constitutional design to broaden the avenues 
through w hich the judiciary and the political branches listen to 
and learn from  each other’s unique perspectives.2$1   
There are thus a host of issues that require further 
consideration in order to enable this broader dual-track vision 
of constitutional dialogue to be realized m ore com pletely in 
constitutional system s around the globe.  Resolving these 
questions of institutional choice is com plex, and w ill ultim ately 
require fact-specific and nation-specific inquiries into how  
institutional arrangem ents operate in different constitutional 
settings.2$2  This research agenda is, how ever, w ell w orth 
pursuing, not only because a broader understanding of 
constitutional dialogue that encom passes both institutional 
and society-w ide aspects is m ore norm atively attractive than 
any other understanding of dialogue previously exam ined, but 
also because it provides the strongest justification for the role 
of judicial review  in dem ocratic constitutionalism .  
V. CONCLUSION 
Theories of constitutional dialogue m ake im portant 
contributions to our understanding of judicial review .  This 
article has revealed, how ever, that there is a great degree of 
  
 2$0 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Verm eule, Institutional D esign of a 
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2001) (exam ining how  the rules that 
structure congressional operations can be m odified to produce “the right quantity and 
quality of congressional deliberation on constitutional questions”). 
 2$1 For exam ple, this option is possible in  Australia w here debate continues 
about the possible design of a federal constitutional or statutory bill of rights.  See 
generally GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE CASE FOR AN AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (2004).  In  
a different context, the issue of broad constitutional reform  is being pressed in  the 
United Kingdom , including the creation of a new  Suprem e Court.  See, e.g., BUILDING 
THE UK’S NEW SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Andrew  
Le Sueur ed., Oxford University Press 2004).  
 2$2 McDonald, supra note 158, at 25; Adrian Verm eule, Judicial Review  and 
Institutional Choice, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2002) (arguing that one of the 
dilem m as of institutional choice is that “w e can’t assess judicial review  w ithout 
answ ering questions that w e lack the inform ation to answ er”). 
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variance in the extent to w hich theories of dialogue are able to 
resolve counterm ajoritarian concerns and provide an attractive 
norm ative vision of the role of judicial review  in dem ocratic 
constitutionalism .  In  broad term s, w e have seen that positive 
theories tend to have the greatest success responding to 
dem ocratic legitim acy concerns, due to the fact that they 
highlight the ability of the political branches of governm ent 
and other social actors to respond to judicial decisions in the 
event of disagreem ent.  More prescriptive theories, in contrast, 
are generally less successful in resolving these concerns as they 
tend to privilege the judicial role in constitutional decision-
m aking, w ithout adequate reason, and leave insufficient space 
for independent political judgm ent about constitutional 
m eaning. 
The success of the different theories in providing a 
satisfying norm ative vision of constitutional dialogue is also 
m ixed.  Theories of judicial m ethod, w hich are the m ost 
strongly prescriptive, are m ost susceptible to norm ative failure 
because their prescriptions for judicial action are too far 
rem oved from  how  judicial review  operates in the real w orld.  
Conversely, structural theories of dialogue, w hich have firm er 
positive foundations, are m ost likely to fall norm atively short 
in relation to providing a satisfying justification for the role of 
courts in dialogic judicial review . 
In  light of these difficulties, the greatest potential for 
achieving a norm atively satisfying understanding of 
constitutional dialogue em erges through the dynam ic fusion of 
the equilibrium  and partnership m odels of dialogue.  As w e 
have seen, equilibrium  theories focus on the role of the 
judiciary in facilitating and fostering society-w ide 
constitutional discussion, w hile partnership m odels draw  
attention to m ore distinct institutional functions that the 
judicial and legislative branches perform  in dialogue w ith one 
another.  The synthesis of these understandings highlights that 
dialogue should ideally incorporate both society-w ide and 
institutional aspects.  Most im portantly, this dual-track 
understanding of dialogue provides the strongest norm ative 
vision of the role of judicial review  in m odern 
constitutionalism , and also the greatest possibility for 
designing im proved constitutional system s that can truly live 
up to the dialogic prom ise.  The challenge that rem ains for 
constitutional theorists is to think of creative design 
m echanism s that w ill enable this vision of dialogue to be m ore 
fully achieved in constitutional system s throughout the w orld. 
